RAMUDU AIYAR Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the conviction by the Chief Presidency Megistrate of the accused under Section 411, Indian Penal Code. The accused was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The stolen property is said to be a particular kind of gold thread which has never been sold before in the Madras market and which is easily identifiable. It would seem that about Rs. 40,000 worth of gold thread including this special kind of thread was stolen from the Port Trust premises some time in April 1922 from certain boxes which had been imported from Europe and kept there. The theft was discovered in April but the stolen property was not traced till the beginning of June. On some clues which the Police obtained they found that this particular kind of gold thread, which is the subject-matter of this case, was purchased by certain Salem merchants from the accused's brother and his gumashtah, and in consequence the accused was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property with reference to this gold thread.

(2.) Mr. Grant appealing for the accused does not dispute that the gold thread in question was really stolen property. The only question which is argued is whether the accused1 received this stolen property "knowing or having reason to believe the some to be" stolen property. It is of the essence of any offence under Section 411 Indian Penal Code, to show that the person who was in possession of the stolen property knew or had reason to believe that it was stolen property. The stolen property was traced to the "accused's possession nearly two months at least after the theft so that the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act can hardly be applied in this case. Then, the question is whether there is evidence in this case sufficient to bring home to the accused the fact that he knew or had reason to believe the property to be stolen property. After hearing the evidence discussed before me, I have come to the conclusion that that evidence is not sufficient to establish the guilty knowledge of the accused, though it throws a very great deal of suspicion upon him. The accused says that he obtained the gold thread which he had from one Guruvappa Chetty and no attempt has been made to prove that this false. Guruvappa Chetty was a co-accused in this case to start with, but subsequently his case was treated as a separate one and the accused was tried only along with his brother who had been discharged. The Magistrate uses the statement made by Guruvappa Chetty as third accused when he was co-accused with the present accused for saying that Guruvappa Chetty never gave these goods to the first accused. I do not think that this was a proper use of his statement at all. As he was taken out of the dock he should have been examined as a witness if the Magistrate intended to rely upon his statement as evidence against the first accused. Even if that had been done, it would be very difficult to say that his evidence would have carried much weight, being himself accused of having been the thief. However, on the record there is no evidence whatever to show that the accused's statement that he bought the goods from Guruvappa Chetty and that he paid Rs. 4,980 for 83 marks of this goldthread is not true. We cannot assume with out evidence that the accused's statement is false. therefore, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that it is false if they propose to rely on its falsehood as against the accused. It is true that the accused's attempt to prove that he did actually give Rs. 4,980 by producing his account-book has not been very successful. I am not prepared to rely upon what appears in his account in his favour. The entry in his book is, as the Magistrate observes, very suspicious for the reasons he has stated. Put it is one thing to find the entry suspicious and to refuse to act upon it and another thing to find the falsehood of what is sought to be proved. Assuming that it has not been proved that his statement that he got the goods from Guruvappa Chetty and that he paid Rs. 4,980 for the goods is not true, the question is whether there is evidence to show that he had reason to believe that Guruvappa Chetty could not have come by the goods honestly or that he should have suspected the bona fides of Guruvappa Chetty in being in possession of these goods and selling them to him. Now the price he has paid, the Crown Prosecutor contends, is such a low price that an adverse inference can be drawn against the accused from that fact alone. I am quite unable to agree with that argument because the price works out at Rs. 60 a mark and the evidence of the prosecution second witness seems to show that that was not at all au unfair price for the goods in the market. No doubt he says that at the time the goods were imported the price including the duty for importation to British India was Rs. 71 but he admits that subsequently the price fell. Apparently at the time of the purchase by the accused it was not more than Rs. 45 without the duty and including the duty which is 30 per cent., it was somewhere about Rs. 60. No adverse inference, therefore, can be drawn from the amount of the purchase-money said to have been pad. It is also argued by the Crown Prosecutor that the two circumstances, namely, that the accused himself was not a dealer in gold thread and that he purchased this gold thread from a person who was not a dealer in gold thread, are very strong evidence against the accussed. I certainly agree that those circumstances are grounds of great suspicion against the accused; but I am not prepared to hold, on these circumstances alone, that the accused had any suspicion or guilty knowledge of the goods being stolen property. Many people in Madras do sometimes speculate in goods in which they do not trade, and to take that as evidence of guilty knowledge would be quite unreasonable. There is no proof in this case that the accused knew that Guruvappa Chetty himself was, as the Crown Prosecutor contends, a firewood seller. He seems to have been a fire-wood seller long prior to this transaction and latterly according to the evidence he had become a seller of gems, and it is not impossible that such a man may on an occasion trade in gold lace. However, the circumstances though no doubt they carry great suspicion with them, are not, in my opinion, sufficient to convict the accused.

(3.) Another point made is that the gold lace was sold in Salem. Each side contends the fact to be in its favour. Mr. Grani says that the fact that it was sold in Salem in open market hawking it from shop to shop is a circumstance in his client's favour showing that he did not know the goods to be stolen as otherwise he would not have attempted to sell the goods in such an open manner. On the other hand, the Crown Prosecutor contends that the fact that the accused did not sell the gold lace in Madras but sent it up country to Salem to have it sold is an indication that he knew there was something wrong with the purchase of the goods. I do not think that either inference can reasonably be drawn. Any merchant in Madras may send goods honestly to Salem and possibly also if a man has stolen goods he might take it away up-country to some station to have them sold there rather than sell them in Madras. I think the circumstance is insufficient to draw a definite inference from. The Crown Prosecutor also contended that because the defence evidence is all untrue I must take it that the accused is a dishonest person and I should, import this dishonesty into his conduct into purchasing gold thread. I am quite unable to do this. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish by its own evidence that the accused is guilty. The weakness of the defence evidence is no ground for finding the accused guilty.