(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff, Subramanya Ayyar, since deceased, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tinnevelly, in the Madras Presidency, on December 21, 1915, under the following circumstances.
(2.) SUBRAMANYA Ayyar, with his brother Krishna Ayyar, who died before the institution of the suit, formed a joint and undivided Hindu family subject to the Mitakshara law. They possessed considerable immovable properties both within the Travancore State and in British territories. The landed properties belonging to them in British India are situated in the Tinnevelly district. In 1915 they decided to separate and make an amicable division of the properties belonging to them, both immovable and movable. By a yadast, or memorandum of agreement, dated January 7, 1915, which is marked as exhibit Ay in these proceedings, they agreed to divide their properties both in Travancore and in British territories according to certain specified shares. Later, on February 1 of the same year, effect was given to this agreement in respect of the properties in Travancore, under which Krishna Ayyar, as the elder brother, obtained, under the designation of jesthabhagam, a larger share than would have come to him otherwise. This document was registered in Travancore, and effect appears to have been given to it in respect of the properties situated in that State. No division, however, was made of the properties in Tinnevelly or separate possession delivered to the parties of their respective shares, Krishna Ayyar having died in the meantime, his son, the present defendant, evaded the fulfilment of the agreement embodied in exhibit Ay; and accordingly Subramanya brought the present suit for its enforcement.
(3.) THE defendant in his written statement raised three objections to the suit: first, that the agreement (Ay) had been obtained by Subramanya from his father under undue influence; secondly, that a large portion of the properties in which the plaintiff claimed a share was his father's self-acquisitions and did not form part of the ancestral estate; and thirdly, that the agreement, not having been registered in British India, could not be admitted in evidence, and no suit for specific performance could be based on it.