NILKANTH DEVRAO NADKARNI Vs. MURARI GOVIND MHALE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question on this appeal is whether defendants Nos. 1 to 4 have been properly appointed trustees of the suit temple. That in its turn depends on whether they were validly appointed trustees on November 15, 1913, by the Temple Committee. This Temple Committee is one appointed under the Religious Endowments Act 1863, and at the date in question it consisted of some ten or eleven members. A notice, Exhibit 39, is alleged to have been given for this Committee to meet at eight o clock in the morning on November 15, 1913. At that hour only two members of the Committee were present, and according to the minutes, Exhibit 34, as there was not present a sufficient number of members to form a quorum for the commencement of the business of the Committee, it was decided that the work of the Committee be deferred and that the Committee should meet at 3 P.M. that day. Then at three o clock that day, three members were present. They then proceeded to transact certain business, and incidentally to elect the defendants I have mentioned.

(2.) Now the real point of the dispute is this: that away back in 1884 or thereabouts the Collector had settled a dispute between the Vaishnavs and the other branch the Smarth sect as to the proportions in which their respective sects should be appointed Muktesars of various temples. As set out in para 3 of the plaint, it was decided that the Muktesars of the first three temples there mentioned should be in the hands of the Smarths only, and that of the other three temples should be in the hands of the Vaishnavs. The plaintiffs allege that by means of the 1913 election the Vaishnavs have got their nominees elected Muktesars of the suit temple, which under the 1884 agreement was to be in the hands of the Smarths. That is what is at the bottom of this dispute.

(3.) It will be seen, therefore, that the question of the appointment is no mere technical matter. In the first place, the appointment of trustees is, generally speaking, a matter in which the terms of the appointment have to be properly complied with. In the second place, particularly when religious feelings are aroused, it is to my mind important that any election should be properly conducted. The learned trial Judge found that the elections were invalid. On appeal, the lower appellate Court set aside this judgment and dismissed the suit holding that the whole suit was bad, because it was within Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the requisite consent of the Collector had not been obtained. That decision was reversed by the High Court, and the case remanded.