(1.) The suit, which has led to this second appeal, was brought by the appellant for partition of property, alleged to be joint and ancestral, and the only question in appeal is whether the claim is barred under Article 127 of Schedule II to the Limitation Act.
(2.) It is found as a fact by both the Courts below that the appellant has been excluded to his knowledge by his co-parceners from enjoyment of the joint property since 1890, i.e., for more than twelve years before the present suit instituted in 1907.
(3.) For the appellant it is contended that the period of exclusion from 1890 to 1898 must be eliminated from the question of limitation, because of a decree for partition passed in 1898 in favour of one of the co-parceners. In the judgment on which that decree was passed it was found that the property now in dispute was joint and partible. That finding, it is urged, was an adjudication in favour of each party to that suit that he was a co-parcener entitled to a share ; and that the adjudication had in law the effect of arresting, in favour of the appellant and as against the respondents, the period of limitation which had begun to run against the appellant from 1890 under Article 127 of the Limitation Act and of giving him a fresh cause of action and starting point of limitation.