RAMCHANDRA DAS Vs. RAO FARZAND ALI KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises oat of a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendants to realise the amount of a mortgage-bond dated the 5th of February 1888. The bond was originally made in favour of Bansi Lal, the father of the plaintiff Seth Ram Chandra Das. The bond was apparently executed by the defendant Rao Farzand Ali Khan on behalf of himself and also on behalf of his mother. The merits of the ease have not been gone into by the Court below and the question involved in this appeal is the question whether or not the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the bond in suit had not been duly registered and accordingly could not be given in evidence by the plaintiff. The bond was in fact registered to this extent at least that it was received in the Registration Office and a certificate of registration is endorsed thereon, or rather certain endorsements appear upon the band. From these endorsements it would appear that the bond was presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar on Monday the 4th of June 1883. Assuming for a moment that the bond was duly presented within the meaning of Section 82 of the Registration Act of 1877, the presentation was made in time. Simultaneously with the presentation of the bond, an application was made under Section 36 of the same Act to summon the executants. They did not appear. The Sub-Registrar considered that execution was not admitted and he, therefore, refused registration. The matter then came before the District Registrar under an application made on behalf of Bansi Lal under Section 73 of the Act. The presence of Farzand Ali was procured and he admitted the execution of the bond. The District Registrar made an order in the following terms: "The document be registered as admitted to have been executed by Farzind Ali Khan." Some way or another the bond found its way baok to the Sab-Registrar s office and was registered. Exactly how the bond found its way back to the Sub-Registrar s office is not very clear. The plaintiff, who is the son of Bansi Lal, in his evidence says: The document was not returned to me by the Judge. It was sent, to the Roorki Tahsil and it was registered there." Except this statement, there is nothing to show how the bond get back to the Sub-Registrar s office, and the witness was speaking of matters which happened more than 20 years before he made his deposition and when he was a boy of about 15 years of age. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the bond had not bean duly registered and that it was not admissible in evidence. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff s suit. Hence the present appeal.

(2.) It is argued on behalf of the defendants, first, that the bond was not in fact duly presented for registration on the ground that the person who presented it was not authorised to make the presentation in the manner prescribed by the Registration Act, and secondly, that even if it be presumed that the first presentation wa3 in accordance with law, it was necessary that there should be a second presentation by a person duly authorised after the Registrar had made his ruling on the application to him under Section 73 to which we have already referred. Section 32 of the Registration Act enumerates the persons who are entitled to present a document for registration: it may be presented by some person executing or claiming under the same, or by a representative or assign of such person or by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Act. From a document issued by the Registration Office which will be found at page 16 of the appellant s book, it would appear that the document in question was presented by one Dasondi Ram, Karinda of Bansi Lal. Section 36 provides means for procuring the attendance before the Registrar of any person whose presence or testimony is necessary for the purpose of registration. Section 60 provides for the endorsement by a Registering officer of a certificate of registration and further provides that such certificate shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by the Act and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to have occurred as certified. In our opinion the production of the bond with the certificate of due registration endorsed thereon raises a strong presumption in favour of the due registration of the bond ; and that, in the absence of clear proof that the requirements of law were not complied with, the Court was bound to admit the document in evidence. Section 114 of the Evidence Act, coupled with Section 60 of the Registration Act, seems to us to be abundant justification for this proposition.

(3.) The defendants strongly rely on the of case of Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim 23 A. 233 : 28 I.A. 15. In that case the person who had executed the deed and on whose behalf the application for registration purported to have been made was dead at the time of the presentation of the document for registration. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the authorisation ceased upon the death of the donor of the power-of attorney, and that consequently the presentation was made by a volunteer, that is to say, by a person who had no authority whatever to "present" the document. They held also that the presentation of the document was not a mere matter of procedure. The distinction between the facts in this case, and in the ca3e before us, is, we think, quite obvious. In the case before their Lordships it was proved by conclusive evidence, and admitted by the parties, that the person presenting the. document purported to do so on behalf of a dead person. In the present case (to deal with the two questions separately) it is not at all admitted that the document was presented for registration by an unauthorised person It is contended that the document to which we have arleady referred shows that the bond was presented by a karinda. It does not at all follow that the karinda may not have been duly authorised in the manner prescribed by the Act.