(1.) The petitioner Ram Prosad charged one Padam Kunjra with assault and (sic). The charge of theft was declared to (sic) and the petitioner was prosecuted (sic) of it under Section 211 of the Penal Code. The trial Magistrate (sic) and sentenced him to six weeks (sic) his appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed. He then moved this Court in revision and obtained a Rule on two grounds.
(2.) The first ground is that "the findings of the learned Judge are very doubtful." As to this, it is true that the Judge his indicated doubts as to whether the petitioner was ever assaulted; but his findings regarding the alleged theft--and it is with these that we are concerned-- appear to me to be the reverse of doubtful. He thinks "there can be no doubt" as to a Munsif having been present at the time of the occurrence, whatever it was; and the fact that the Munsif heard nothing of any such "serious affair" as the theft charged, he considers "an extremely strong reason for holding that no theft took place." He records the opinion that, apart from the denial of the persons accused by the petitioner, the other circumstances of the case to his mind show clearly that no theft took place" and there cannot be the slightest doubt that the charge of theft was absolutely false"; and he conclude with the observation that "even if the accusation of assault be true, it is clear that the present accused has committed an offence under Section 211 for bringing the accusation of theft." In the face of these unequivocally expressed conclusions, the first ground must, I think, be held to fail.
(3.) The second of the grounds upon which the Rule was obtained, is that the Sessions Judge "could not, on the finding that the defence evidence was suspicious, hold that the evidence of prosecution, which he before held not sufficient, thereby became sufficient." Now, if the first half of the judgment be ignored and the second half (beginning with the words The three persons accused by Ram Prosad") be treated as if it were the whole, the criticism here suggested would be fair; although, even then, it would be open to the counter-criticism that the "defence evidence" referred to, that is to say, the obviously interpolated entry in the account book of Jagan Ram, was produced by Jagan Ram, who was called by the prosecution for the purpose, and not by the defence. The investigating Police officer had examined the account book and noticed the suspicious entry, and, according to him, Jagan Ram then admitted that he had been told to add it, In these circumstances, Jagan Ram was very properly called as a witness by the prosecution; and, although he in Court denied that he had altered his book, the interpolation is there, and it cannot, in my opinion, be held that its existence is a matter to which the Courts below were not entitled to refer.