RAM CHARAN CHANDA TALUKDAR Vs. TARIPULLA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case a Munsif dismissed a suit on a bond, and the decree was upheld by the Appellate Court. An application for sanction to prosecute the plaintiff for offences under Sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code was refused by the Munsif. Prom this order an appeal was preferred evidently to the District Judge: this appeal was heard by the Subordinate Judge, who reversed the order of the Munsif and granted sanction. The plaintiff obtained this Rule for setting aside the order of the Subordinate Judge.

(2.) It is contended by the learned Vakil for the petitioner that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order that he has made, and on the merits that the order of the Munsif refusing sanction was a proper one and should not have been set aside as the Courts which decided the bond suit went upon the failure of the plaintiff to prove his case. The learned Vakil for the opposite party contends that we cannot go into the second question, as we have no jurisdiction to interfere under Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the rule must be discharged, unless we uphold the first contention, in which case we may have jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. I shall deal with the first question first. Section 195, Clause (6) of the Criminal Procedure Code, provides that "any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate." Clause (7) provides that "every Court shall be deemed subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie." Chapter III of the Civil Courts Act, which is headed as dealing with ordinary jurisdiction, contains Section 21, of which Clause (2) says that, "save as aforesaid, an appeal from a decree or order of a Munsif shall lie to the District Judge." The saving is in respect of any provision to the contrary in any other Act, and is not material in this case, as there is no suggestion that there is any such special enactment applicable to it. Clause (4) of Section 21 provides that the High Court may under certain circumstances allow appeals lying to the District Judge to be preferred to the Court of a particular Subordinate Judge. That also is not material, as there is no suggestion that there is any such special order applicable to the present case. No appeal lay to the Subordinate Judge, and he was, therefore, not the authority which could grant or revoke a sanction refused or granted by the Munsif. It is true that under Section 24, Clause (a) of the Civil Procedure Code, the District Judge can transfer any suit, appeal or proceeding pending before him to any subordinate Court competent to try it, but the Subordinate Judge was not competent to try this appeal, as he was not the authority to which the appeal lay. The order of the Subordinate Judge was, therefore, incompetent.

(3.) As regards the second question, there is some conflict of authority. The Allahabad High Court has held that under Section 195, Clause (6), there can be only one proceeding by way of appeal from an order giving or refusing a sanction, and as soon as the Appellate Court makes an order either way, there is no further appeal: see Emperor v. Serhmal (1908) All. W.N. Kanhai Lal v. Chhadammi Lal (1908) I.L.R. 31 All. 48. The Madras High Court has decided that an appeal lies to the High Court not only in cases where the first Court refuses sanction and sanction is granted by the Court to which that Court is immediately subordinate, but also in cases where the first Court grants sanction and the sanction is revoked by the Court to which that Court is immediately subordinate: see Muthuswami Mudali v. Veeni Chetti (1907) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 382. The learned Judges differ from the Calcutta ruling in Hamiiuddi Mondol v. Damodar Ghose (1906) 10 C.W.N. 1026 and agree with two subsequent Calcutta rulings, Habibur Ra aman v. Munshi Khodabux (1906) 11 C.W.N. 195 Giriia Sankar Ray v. Binode Sheikh (1906) 5 C.L.J. 222. The same point was raised in the case of Ram Proshad Malla v. Baghubar Malla (1909) I.L.R. 37 Calc. 13 : 13 C.W.N. 1038 but the learned Judges, whilst expressing an inclination in favour of the Madras view, supported as it was by some of the Calcutta cases, preferred to interfere under Section 622 of the old Civil Procedure Code. It is not necessary, however, to pursue this question further, as our view on the first question is sufficient to dispose of this Rule.