LAWS(PVC)-1912-2-87

SHEOAMBAR AHIR Vs. COLLECTOR OF AZAMGARH

Decided On February 24, 1912
SHEOAMBAR AHIR Appellant
V/S
COLLECTOR OF AZAMGARH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This and the connected appeal arise out of suits in which the plaintiff s sought a declaration that no custom existed in their village which entitled zamindars to take certain fruits and wood, or a right to the use of a plough and a number of other alleged dues, including sugarcane juice from some of the tenants, poppy seed from the Koeries, and various other matters of the same description. The suit was instituted in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Azamgarh. He decided that the suit was not cognizable in a civil court and he declined to return the plaint for presentation in the proper court. The learned District Judge in first appeal affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The plaintiffs come here in second appeal.

(2.) I think that the question whether or not the villagers are liable to these dues is a question of very great importance, no matter what is the proper tribunal to decide it. However, all that we have to decide in the present appeal is whether or not the suit is cognizable by a civil court.

(3.) In my opinion the suit was cognizable in the civil court. Prima facie the civil court is the court to decide all cases of a civil nature. Only cases which by express enactment are withdrawn from the cognizance of the civil court are not triable by that court. It is argued that Section 95 read with Section 167 excludes the present suit from the cognizance of the civil court. Section 167 provides that the suits specified in the fourth schedule shall only be cognizable in the revenue court: included in the fourth schedule are the suits specified in Section 95. Section 95 provides that at any time during the continuance of the tenancy either the landholder or the tenant may sue for a declaration as to any matters there mentioned. Amongst these matters is the rent payable in respect of a holding and whether it is payable in cash or in kind. It is argued that this suit is a suit as to the rent payable for the holding, and whether it is payable in cash or kind. Reliance is also placed upon Section 233, Clause (i), of the Land Revenue Act, which provides that no suit shall be instituted in the civil court by a tenant in respect of the rent payable by him.