(1.) Sufficient time has not run to allow of the trespass to have matured into prescription. The last decree passed in the suit between the parties was on the 17th December 1900, and the present suit was instituted on the 29th September 1910.
(2.) The pleas 3 and 4 taken in appeal fail.
(3.) The question does arise whether Section 34 authorizes or is sufficient to provide for the ejectment of a trespasser. Section 34 says that a person occupying land, without the consent of the landholder, shall be liable for the rent of that land at the rate payable in the previous year. Prima facie, if he is liable for rent, it would seem that he is liable to the consequences which follow when rent is not paid and also to such consequences as would enure is the case of non-occupancy tenants holding on under similar circumstances. On comparing the language used in Section 4, Clause 5, where tenant is described as a parson by whom rent is, or bat for a contract, express or implied, would be payable," it would appear that the intention of the Legislature is that such trespassers should be liable to ejectment as though they were non-occupancy tenants. If this view be right, the first two pleas taken in the memorandum of appeal also fail.