GOVERNMENT PLEADER Vs. ANNAJI NARAYAN DESHPANDE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition by the Government Pleader who invokes the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court against two pleaders, named Deshpande and Kanmadi. The former was enrolled as a District Pleader in 1895, and the latter was enrolled in 1896. The charges against these persons are set out in detail in the Government Pleader s petition and need not at present be recapitulated. It will be enough for the moment to say that they involve alleged acts of fraud and gross misconduct. These proceedings are taken under class. 56 of Regulation II of 1827, which provides that a pleader accused of a criminal offence, or guilty of misbehaviour or neglect of duty, shall be liable to be suspended or dismissed ; and the first argument which has been addressed to us turns upon the construction of the words of this clause, particularly the word misbehaviour which is the governing word in this case. For the purposes of considering this argument we must of course assume that the acts of fraud and misconduct, alleged against the opponents, were committed by them. It has been contended by Mr. Khare for the first opponent Deshpande, and also by Mr. Campbell for the second opponent, Kanmadi, that the word misbehaviour in class. 56 must be narrowly construed so as to be restricted to misbehaviour in the strict course of a pleader s professional duties. We are, however, unable to accept this construction. It appears to us that the words of the clause itself do not favour the argument; and the occurrence of the word misbehaviour in juxtaposition with the case of a pleader merely accused of a criminal offence rather suggests that the misbehaviour need not neeessrore. be restricted to professional misbehaviour. It is class as the over, that the larger construction ; is the "T" the case of authority of this Court, for upon that construction the case of Government Pleader v. Jagannath (1908) I.L.R. 33 Bom. 252 : 10 Bom. L.R. 1169 was decided. Lastly, there appears to us to be no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended in this matter to enact a laxer. rule of practice in India than the rule which prevails in England. The rule prevailing in England, however, is clearly against the opponents contention. That contention was considered in re Blake (1860) 3 E & E. 34, 38 and was disallowed by Cock- burn C. J., who said that in deciding that case he would " proceed on the general ground that, where an attorney is shown to have been guilty of gross fraud, although the fraud is neither such as renders him liable to an indictment, nor was committed by him while the relation of attorney and client was subsisting between him and the person defrauded, or in his character as an attorney, this Court will not allow suitors to be exposed to gross fraud and dishonesty at the hands of one of its officers." Mr. Justice Wightman in concurring said that it was of the greatest importance that- transactions to which attorneys are parties should be uberrimcefidei, and that the conduct of those who are accredited as officers of the Court should be above suspicion. So Mr. Justice Crompton, in repudiating the narrower view of the Court s jurisdiction, quoted from Lush s Practice, where it is laid down that for any gross misconduct, whether in the course of his professional practice or otherwise, the Court will expunge the name of the attorney from the roll. Mr. Justice Blackburn in explaining his reasons for the same view said: "It is not necessary, in order to induce the Court to interfere in a summary manner, that the misconduct charged should either amount to an indictable offence, or arise out of a transaction in which the relation of attorney and client subsists between the attorney and the person against whom he has been guilty of; misconduct. " He quoted with approval what was said by Baron Alderson in Stephens v. Hill (1842) 10 M. & W. 28, 34, namely, " if persons are to be accredited by the Court, it is our duty to watch over and control their conduct." This case was followed in Re Hill (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 543, where Chief Justice Cockburn says: " I am perfectly prepared to abide by what I said in Blake. When an attorney does that which involves dishonesty, it is for the interest of the suitors that the Court should interpose and prevent a man guilty of such misconduct from acting as attorney of the Court." Mr. Justice Blackburn also used language which is apt to our present purpose. He said: " We are to see that the officers of the Court t are proper persons to be trusted by the Court with regard to the interests of suitors, and we are to look to the character l and position of the persons, and judge of the acts committed by them upon the same principle as if we were considering . whether or not a person is fit to become an attorney." Reference may also be made to In re Weare [1893] 2 Q.B. 439, where the Court upheld the view that its jurisdiction was complete even although the misconduct of the attorney was not professional misconduct. Lord Justice Lindley in discussing the question says: " What is the function of the Court in considering applications *** to strike solicitors off the rolls? It is impossible to express that function better than in the language of Loid Mansfield in the case of Re Brounsall (1778) 2 Cowp. 829, which was repeated and adopted with little variation in the later case of Rex. v. Southerton (1805) 6 East 126. The question is whether a man is a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of solicitors and practise as such. That is the question." Lastly it may be observed that the Sanad which was issued to these opponents recites that they shall not be liable to M removal from their situation " during their-good behaviour," the words good behaviour being apparently of a general description. For these reasons we are of opinion that it is incorrect to hold that this Court s jurisdiction in such matters is limited to cases where a pleader s alleged misconduct is committed in the course of his professional duties.

(2.) It remains to determine whether or not the Government Pleader has succeeded in establishing the charges which he has made against these opponents. We are clearly of opinion that he has so succeeded; and in our judgment nothing more is required to establish that proposition than to set out the facts as they are now ascertained to be. We do not pause to discuss those facts at any length. For the most part they are admitted facts; and although a minor detail here and there has been challenged, or an attempt has been made to put an innocent complexion upon one or two incidents, we are satisfied on the evidence, and after hearing all the arguments, that the true view of the facts of this case is the view which was taken by the District Judge, and on appeal by this Court.

(3.) The facts, then, to which we refer, are in substance these : The genealogy of the parties concerned is given in the District Judge s judgment and need not now be repeated. Pandurang Shatnji owned a house and certain Survey Numbers in the village of Madbhavi. In 1902 Pandurang died, leaving his widow Rakhamabai and a separated brother, Govind. His son Narsu having predeceased Pandurang, his daughter Dhondubai was left in a position of exceptional helplessness, seeing that her own husband was a half-witted man. In 1904 Pandurang s widow died ; and in the same year the predeceased son s widow Venubai filed Suit No. 174 of 1904 against Rakhamabai and the mortgagees of certain parts of Pandurang s property, for arrears of maintenance and for future maintenance. Rakhmabai died during the pendency of this suit, and her three daughters were brought on the record as defendants in her stead. In this suit Deshpande was the pleader for Venubai, while Kanmadi was the pleader for the mortgagee, Ghanappa. Dhondubai pleaded that Pandurang s property had been given to her by Pandurang during his life and that it was not liable for Venubai s maintenance. Dwarkabai on the other hand admitted Venubai s claim and her liability to satisfy one-third of it. The defendant Ghenappa urged that the properties which he held in mortgage were not liable as his claim was prior. In the end a decree was passed substantially in favour of Venubai, but the lands mortgaged to Ghenappa were excluded from the properties liable to contribute on the ground that the mortgages were effected during Pandurang s life-time. The Court disallowed Dhondubai s claim that the properties were given to her by Pandurang. This decree, which was made in October 1905, threw upon Venubai the obligation to pay Court-fees.