RAM CHANDRA DAS Vs. FARZAND ALI KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendants to realize the amount of a mortgage bond, dated the 5th February, 1888. The bond was originally made in favour of Bansi Lal, the father of the plaintiff Sath Ram Chandra Das. The bond was apparently executed by the defendant, Rao Farzand Ali Khan, on behalf of himself and also on behalf of his mother. The merits of the case have not been gone into by the court below and the question involved in this appeal is the question whether or not the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the bond in suit had not been duly registered, and accordingly could not be given in evidence by the plaintiff. The bond was, in fact, registered to this extent at least, that it was received in the Registration office and a certificate of registration is endorsed thereon, or rather certain endorsements appear upon the bond. From these endorsements it would appear that the bond was presented for registration in the office of the Sub-Registrar on Monday, the 4th of June, 1888. Assuming for a moment that the bond was duly presented, within the meaning of Section 32 of the Registration Act of 1877, the presentation was made in time. Simultaneously with the presentation of the bond an application was made under Section 36 of the same Act to summon the executants. They did not appear. The Sub-Registrar considered that execution was not admitted and he therefore refused registration. The matter then came before the District Registrar under an application made on behalf of Bansi Lal under Section 73 of the Act. The presence of Farzand Ali was procured and he admitted the execution of the bond. The District Registrar made an order in the following terms :--" The document be registered as admitted to have been executed by Farzand Ali Khan". Some way or another bond found its way back to the Sub-Registrar s office and was registered. Exactly how the bond found its way back to the Sub-Registrar s office is not very clear. The plaintiff, who is the son of Bansi Lal, in his evidence says :-- "The document was not returned executed and authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Act. From a document issued by the Registration office, which will be found at page 16 of the appellant s book, it would appear that the document in question was presented by one Dasondhi Rai, karinda of Bansi Lal. Section 36 provides means for procuring the attendance before the Registrar of any person whose presence or testimony is necessary for the purpose of registration. Section 60 provides for the endorsements by the Registering Officer of a certificate of registration and further provides that such certificate shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by the Act, and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred to have occurred as certified. In our opinion the production of the bond with the certificate of due registration endorsed thereon raised a strong presumption in favour of the due registration of the bond ;to me by the Judge. It was sent to the Roorki Tahsil and it was registered there." Except this statement there is nothing to show how the bond got back to the Sub-Registrar s office, and the witness was speaking of matters which happened more than twenty years before he made his deposition and when he was a boy of about fifteen years of age. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the bond had not been duly registered and that accordingly it was not admissible in evidence. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff?s suit. Hence the present appeal.

(2.) It is argued on behalf of the defendants, first, that the bond was not in fact duly presented for registration, on the ground that the person who presented it was not authorized to make the presentation in the manner prescribed by the Registration Act; and, secondly, that, even if it be presumed that the first presentation was in accordance with law, it was necessary that there should be a second presentation by a person duly authorized after the Registrar had made his ruling on the application to him under Section 73, to which we have already referred. Section 32 of the Registration Act enumerates the persons who are entitled to present a document for registration ; it may be presented by some person executing or claiming under the same, or by a representative or assign of such person, or by the agent of such person, representative or assign duly authorized by power of attorney and that in the absence of clear proof that the requirements of law were not complied with, the court was bound to admit the document in evidence. Section 114 of the Evidence Act coupled . with Section 60 of the Registration Act seems to us to be abundant justification for this proposition.

(3.) The defendants strongly rely on the case of Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdul Rahim (1901) I.L.R. 23 All. 233. In that case the person who had executed the deed and on whose behalf the application for registration purported to have been made was dead at the time of the presentation of the document for registration. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the authorization ceased upon the death of the donor of the power of attorney, and that consequently the presentation was made by a volunteer, that is to say, by a person who had no authority whatever to "present" the document. They held also that the presentation of the document was not a mere matter of procedure. The distinction between the facts in this case, and in the case before us is, we think, quite obvious. In the case before their Lordships it was proved by conclusive evidence, and admitted by the parties, that the person presenting the document purported to do so on behalf of the dead person. In the present case (to deal with the two questions separately) it is not at all admitted that the document was presented for registration by an unauthorized person. It is contended that the document to which we have already referred shows that the bond was presented by the karinda. It does not at all follow that the karinda may not have been duly authorized in the manner prescribed by the Act.