(1.) There were only two points urged by the learned Counsel in support of this appeal in his opening address, first, that there was a valid contract as between the Government and the plaintiff, who is the appellant, in consequence of his application to the Commissioner to purchase this land, and the acceptance by him of the conditions which were imposed by the Commissioner in consequence of that offer. It was urged that after the Commissioner had accepted the plaintiff s proposal to purchase this land by receipt of the money, it was not competent to Government to rescind the Commissioner s order, because, it was said, the acceptance vested the title in the appellant. It is not necessary to go at length into the reasons for disallowing this argument, because the learned Counsel has himself given it up in his rejoinder.
(2.) It is clear, from the provisions of the Land Revenue Code, and from the correspondence which passed between the different officers of Government, at the time the proposal of the plaintiff to purchase this land was considered, that the Commissioner was acting under Section 60 of the Land Revenue Code, and that there was a Resolution of Government, at that time in force, which required that in respect of land of this description the Commissioner, and the Collector could sell it only after obtaining the sanction of Government. Plainly upon the facts this was Railway land, not required just then for Railway purposes, and therefore, according to the evidence of Exhibit 44 the Commissioner could not dispose of it, in the way he did, without obtaining the sanction of Government.
(3.) The point on which the learned Counsel has laid special emphasis is his second argument; it is this. He urges : If the plaintiff has not acquired any title in virtue of the Commissioner s order, he has a right to fall back upon his old Kabulayat (Exhibit 15). Under that Kabulayat the occupancy had been granted to him by the Collector subject only to this condition that it should be competent to Government to resume the land whenever it should be required for Government purposes, i. e., for Railway or other purposes. It is urged that the sale of the land to defendant No. 2, a private individual, is not such a purpose.