SAMARUDDI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the appellant Samaruddi has been convicted by the unanimous verdict of a jury of offences under Sections 147 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code, and has been sentenced by the Additional Sessions Judge of Dacca to two years rigorous imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The appeal is, therefore, open to him only on the questions of law relating to the charge of the Additional Sessions Judge.

(2.) The first point that has been urged before us is that the Judge was in error in putting before the jury what he calls "a third alternative." It should be stated that, before the trial began in the Sessions Court, the charge was amended, and, as eventually framed, the common object alleged was "in order to take forcible possession of complainant Pandab s land and hut and to assault Pandab, Joydeb, Chandra Kishore and Karam Ali." The Judge suggested to the jury that the case might not be precisely as the prosecution alleged, and at the same time might not be what the defence endeavoured to set up, but something between the two, namely, that the complainant s party might have gone to turn Madhu Mala out of possession, that they were resisted and driven out of the land by the Kusumhati sardars, that up to that point the Kusumhati sardars might have been acting within their rights, but that they went further and intoxicated with success or anger or both determined to teach the complainant s party a lesson and assaulted them. Reliance was placed on the case of Banga Hadua v. King- Emperor (1909) 11 C. L. J. 270. and also on the cases of Queen v. Sabid Ali (1873) 20 W. R. Cr. 5. and Wafadar Khan v. Queen-Empress (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 955. But these cases are quite distinguishable on their facts. We can see no reason why the Judge should not have made this suggestion to the jury. He left it entirely open to them as to whether they would accept it or not, and we cannot agree in the contention of the learned pleader for the appellant that, if it was accepted, it would entirely destroy the prosecution case. The Full Bench case of Queen v. Sabid Ali (1873) 20 W. R. Cr. 5. cited above was quite different from the present, as was also the case of Wafadar Khan v. Queen-Empress (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 955. There the charge was altered at the end of the case for the prosecution, and a totally different common object was alleged. Here there has been one common object alleged throughout, and it cannot be suggested that the accused did not know exactly what they had to meet.

(3.) In the second place, it is argued that the learned Judge s explanation of Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code is faulty, and that "violence" cannot mean violence against inanimate objects. No authority has been cited for such a proposition, and we see no reason for restricting the meaning of the word "violence" in the manner stated. It could hardly he said that, if an unlawful assembly came together for the purpose, say, of pulling down a man s house, and they proceeded to carry out the object, they could not be said to have used " violence."