SOMA BALLACHARIAR Vs. THIRUVENKATACHARIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiffs in this case are persons who are entitled to the 1st, 3rd and 4th thirthams in the temple of Thirunagiri Ranganatha Swamy. Defendants Nos. 7 to 23 are entitled to thirtham along with them. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are the trustees of the temple and defendants Nos. 4 to 6 are the Archakas, whose duty it is to carry on the daily worship of the idol. The object of the suit is to establish the plaintiffs right to receive the thirtham first after the conclusion of the siva and Sathu-murai, that is, after the recitation of Tamil Vedas and hymns. In the plaint, the " plaintiffs ask also for the establishment of their lights to other emoluments appertaining to the office they hold, but the right to these other honours and emoluments was really not denied by any of the defendants. There was a previous suit by some of the defendants jointly entitled to the 1st thirtham along with the plaintiffs for the establishment of their right to the honours and emoluments attached to the office. That suit was against the trustees and the suit ended in a compromise which will be referred to hereafter. The plaintiffs stated that while that suit was going on, the trustees and the Archakas acting in combination introduced an innovation which consisted in the Archakas taking the thirtham before it was offered to the plaintiffs and the other co-owners of the first thirtham office. The plaintiffs state that at the time of the compromise in the previous suit, the parties agreed that this innovation should be put "an end to, bat it was considered unnecessary to enter this understanding in the compromise.

(2.) Both the trustees and the Archakas deny the particular right set up now, namely, that the Archakas should not take the thirtham before it is given to the plaintiffs. In the written statement of the Archakas in para. 6, they state: It is always the practice for these defendants to take the thirtham first and then serve it to the plaintiffs, etc. It is in consonance with the custom, the Shastras and practice. It is included in religious rights and ceremomies. The plaintiff has no right to ask for any relief in that regard in a Civil Court.

(3.) In addition to the issues relating to the merits, there was an issue as to the right of a Civil Court to take cognizance of the suit. Both the lower Courts have found as a matter of fact that according to the usage and practice of the temple, after the Siva and Sathumurai were over, the Archakas were not in the habit of taking thirtham themselves before making the distribution to the thir-thamgars or to the various persons entitled to precedence in the distribution of the thirtham. That finding is based on the oral evidence in the case as well as on three documents. It has been contended in second appeal before us that these documents have been misconstrued; and in the course of the arguments it was also urged that two of these documents, namely, Exhibit B and Exhibit I, are not admissible in evidence at all against the defendants. Exhibit B is not of much importance. It is an agreement executed between the holders of the offices of the first and second thirthams and the defendants; the Archahas and trustee were not parties to it. The inadmissibility would really be a matter of no consequence, as it is stated that it was superseded by Exhibit I, which was executed in the year 1836. This document is an award passed by first and second defendants father who was then the trustee of the temple. It set out the rights of the thirthimgars. It was apparently contended before the District Munsif that it would in no way bind the Archakas and trustees. But there was evidence before him showing that the Archakas were also parties to the dispute and that they made statements regarding their rights. The document does not contain any reference to Archaka s rights to take the thirtham first and both the Courts have drawn the inference from that fact that no such right existed at the time, as otherwise it would have been put forward. How far this inference is well founded is not really a matter for our consideration in second appeal. No objection was raised in the grounds of appeal in the lower Appellate Court to the admissibility of the document in evidence against the Archakas or the trustees, evidently because the document was put forward by the defendants themselves. The contest in the lower Appellate Court was about its effect as against the Archakas and the trustees. If the question of its admissibility had been raised, the District Judge would, no doubt, have had to consider whether, as found by the District Munsif, the Archakas themselves were not really parties to the dispute which was settled by the compromise. We cannot allow any question regarding its admissibility to be raised at this stage.