SABAPATHY CHETTY Vs. RANGAPPA NAICKEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE do not think that the District Judge was right in holding that the day on which the property was put up for sale and knocked down was the date on which the plaintiff's cause of action arose. The provisions of Section 38 of the Act II (of 1864), which were first enacted as an amendment by Act III of 1884, show that until confirmation by the Collector the sale proceedings are incomplete, and are liable to be set aside or confirmed by the Collector either on the application of the parties, or of his own motion. It is the confirmation of the sale which gives to the purchaser the right to possession, and to have the lands registered in his name. Until the sale proceedings have been confirmed, it cannot properly be said that the rights of persons whose interests will be affected by the sale are injured so as to give them a right of suit as persons aggrieved within the meaning of Section 59 of the Act. To hold otherwise would lead to the unreasonable result that a party would be obliged to take futile proceedings before the expiry of six months from the sale in order to protect himself against the possible action of the revenue authorities in connection with the sale at some subsequent time. For example, in the present case, the sale was set aside by the Deputy Collector, (who was entitled to confirm or set it aside under the law) on the 16 December 1898, i.e., before the expiry of six months from the date of the sale (19 August 1898). It was not until long after the expiry of the six months that the Collector reversed the Deputy Collector's order and confirmed the sale. If the view adopted by the District Judge, and urged for the respondent, were correct, the present plaintiff should have brought a suit as an aggrieved party within six months of the sale, though he had obtained satisfaction and got the sale set aside by applying to the Deputy Collector, and had no further grievance. It is scarcely necessary to say that the Legislature could not have intended the taking of such futile proceedings, and the only reasonable view is that, in cases like the present, there is no grievance giving a right to sue until there is an order confirming the sale.

(2.) THE decision in Venkata V/s. Chengadu I.L.R., 12 M. 168 was in regard to a sale that took place before the provisions of the present Section 38 were enacted and when the law made no provision for the confirmation of sales by the Collector and when therefore the sale was complete as soon as it was held. That decision has no bearing on the present case. We set aside the decree of the District Judge and remand the appeal for decision on the merits. Costs in this Court will abide the result.