SHANMUGA MUDALY Vs. PALNATI KUPPU CHETTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In Second Appeals Nos. 1095 and 1096 of 1900.--The construction of the last paragraph of Section 10 of the Rent Recovery Act, 1865, seems to me to be clear. The section enacts that if within a given period from the date of the Collector's judgment the defendant does not accept the patta as approved or amended the defendant may be ejected. The word "accepted" implies an offer and the use of the word "default" also shows that the Legislature intended there should be an offer as a condition precedent to an order for ejectment being obtained. In the case of Court of Wards V/s. Darmalinga I.L.R. 8 Mad. 2 the suit was for rent. I cannot adopt the view that the judgment of the Collector amending the patta constitutes a sufficient tender to entitle the landlord to eject the tenant and if the decision is to be regarded as an authority for this proposition, I respectfully dissent from it. The provision in Section 10 is a penal one and ought to be construed strictly. It seems to one impossible to adopt the construction for which the plaintiff contends without doing violence to the express words of the section. The question of the right to eject when there had been no offer of the amended patta was not discussed in the case of Munisami Naidu V/s. Perumal Reddi I.L.R. 23 Mad. 616. I think our answer to the question which has been referred to us should be in the negative.

(2.) In Second Appeals Nos. 1271 and 1272 of 1900.--In these cases it was contended that where the Collector is of opinion that the patta is a proper one and passes a judgment directing the defendant to accept it, an offer of the patta after judgment is not a condition precedent to ejectment. The argument was that whatever may be the true view when the Collector is of opinion that the patta tendered is not a proper one and decides, under paragraph 4 of the section, what patta ought to be offered and passes a judgment ordering the defendant to accept it, when the Collector is of opinion that the patta is a proper one and passes a judgment, under paragraph 3 of the section, directing the defendant to accept it, the defendant is bound, as from the date of the judgment, to accept the patta which has already been offered to him and consequently no tender after judgment is required. I am certainly not disposed to apply this doctrine of constructive offer by relation back in construing the plain words of a penal enactment. The last paragraph of Section 10 draws no distinction between a patta as "approved" and a patta as "amended" and I think the word "accepted" must be construed in both cases in the same way as indicating that an offer after judgment must be made by the landlord before he can eject.

(3.) I think our answer should be in the negative. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.