SREERAMULU Vs. KRISTAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is found that the plaintiff was adopted in 1887 by the 1 defendant in pursuance of authority given to her by her husband who died prior to 1878. The lands mentioned in the plaint were sold in March 1879, during the minority of the 1 defendant, by her guardian and father, to the 8 defendant. This suit was instituted in 1895 (September), more than three years after plaintiff had attained his age of majority, to eject the 8 defendant and those claiming under him and recover possession of the lands on the ground that the alienation thereof was not made for purposes which will bind the inheritance in the hands of the reversionary heirs of the 1 defendant's husband. The District Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation, either under article 142 or 144 on the ground that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of the alienation, i.e., 1879, and not from the date of the plaintiff's adoption, 1887, and that within the definition of the word " plaintiff " in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1877, the plaintiff in the present case, notwithstanding that he claims the lands as the heir of his adoptive father, should be regarded as one who derives his right to sue from or through his adoptive mother, the first defendant.

(2.) The 1 defendant, after attaining the age of majority, did not repudiate the alienation made by her guardian and the case has been argued before us on the footing that the alienation of 1879 should be regarded as one made by the 1 defendant herself. The learned pleader for the appellant contends that the suit is not barred by limitation, as it has been instituted within 12 years from the date of the plaintiff's adoption and the District Judge is wrong in his view that the plaintiff should be regarded as deriving his right to sue from or through his adoptive mother, the 1 defendant. The learned pleader was also required to argue on what principle he maintained that the plaintiff was entitled to eject the vendee during the lifetime of the 1 defendant.

(3.) Regarding the alienation in question, as one made by a widow who had authority from her husband to make an adoption, which authority was exercised and the adoption made only subsequent to the alienation, I am of opinion, that, if the plaintiff were entitled to maintain this suit, during the lifetime of the widow, the period of limitation should be computed only from the date of the plaintiff's adoption and not from the date of the alienation, but that the vendee, having prior to the plaintiff's adoption acquired under the alienation in question an estate in the land during the lifetime of the widow, the adoption of the plaintiff cannot divest him of that estate and that consequently this suit is not maintainable during her lifetime.