RAJA HAR NARAIN SINGH Vs. CHAUDHRAIN BHAGWANT KUAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS case must, in their Lordships' opinion, be decided entirely upon the construction of the Civil Procedure Code, Sections 508, 514, and 521, and it does not appear that the construction of those sections can be very much aided by analogies drawn from sections of the English Common Law Procedure Act which have been referred to. dealing with arbitrations, because a specific rule has been laid down in the Code for dealing with arbitrations, probably grounded on reasons of public policy.

(2.) By Section 508 it is laid down that the Court shall by order refer to the arbitrator the matter in difference which he is required to determine, and shall fix such time as it thinks reasonable for the delivery of the award and specify such time in the order. In this case the order of reference made by the Court does not specify, directly, any time. It merely fixes a date for the hearing of the case by the Court, which is not in strict compliance with the terms of the section, though it might be sufficient. Their Lordships are of opinion that Section 508 is not merely directory, but that it is mandatory and imperative. Section 521 declares that no award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by the Court, and it appears to their Lordships that this section would be rendered inoperative if Section 508 is to be merely treated as directory. In the present ease, however, the Subordinate Judge repeatedly made orders enlarging the time, and in those orders fixed the time within which the award was to be made, although he did not do so in the original order of reference; and their Lordships are of opinion that it was competent for the Subordinate Judge to do so under Section 514 of the Code, which enables the Court to grant a further time, and from time to time to enlarge the period, for the delivery of the award, in cases when it cannot be completed within that period from want of necessary evidence or from any other cause. The last order of enlargement made by the Subordinate Judge was on the l3th of March, 1885, extending the time to the 20th of March, 1885, and no Longer. No award was delivered within that time, though one was delivered on the 24th of March, 1885, and the first question which appears to their Lordships to arise is whether it would have been competent for the Subordinate Judge to have extended the time after the award was made. Their Lordships are of opinion that it would not. When once the award was made and delivered, the power of the Court under Section 514 was spent, and although the Court had the fullest power to enlarge the time under that section as long as the award was not completed, it no longer possessed any such power when once that time was passed. The Court did, however, receive the award delivered on the 24th of March, 1885, and a decree was made upon it by the Subordinate Judge, which was confirmed by the High Court, The objection now put forward for the Appellant is that this award is not valid. That contention has to support it the express statutory enactment that no award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by the Court. The utmost period allowed by the Court was until the 20th of March, 1885, and therefore the award delivered on the 24th of March, 1885, was so delivered by arbitrators who no longer had any lawful authority to make it. Again, as a matter of fact, there was no enlargement of the time made by the Court after the 20th of March, 1885.

(3.) This objection to the award was apparently not brought to the notice either of the Subordinate Judge or of the High Court. But the statute is there, and the Judges were bound to take judicial notice of it.