(1.) THIS is a suit between two undivided Hindu families, who may be conveniently described as the "plaintiffs" and the "defendants," because, whilst some of the transactions to which it relates are denied, it is not disputed that the individual members, who are alleged to have entered into those transactions, had authority which would have enabled them to bind their respective families. As originally framed, the plaint concluded for repayment of specific advances with interest; but, before the adjustment of issues, it was amended, so as to cover a claim for a partnership accounting in regard to all abkari contracts taken up by them and the defendants during the period of three years, commencing from 9th March 1878;
(2.) THE plaintiffs, who are the present appellants, complain of a judgment of the High Court of Madras, reversing an order passed by Sir Charles Turner, C.J., in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of the Court, in so far only as the reversal concerns (1) the rate of interest payable by the defendants upon an admitted loan of Rs. 55,000, (2) the right of the plaintiffs to participate in certain abkari contracts effected in their own name by the defendants, and (3) the validity and effect of a writing, bearing date the 16th September 1880, signed by the managing member of the plaintiffs' family. The argument at the bar has been confined to these points, which will be noticed in the order in which they have been stated.
(3.) THE plaintiffs now maintain that the undertaking given by the defendants operated as a complete novation of the debt: that it transmuted the loan of Rs. 55,000, bearing 4 1/2 percent, interest into a legal claim for the principal sum of Rs. 62,425, upon which, in the absence of any stipulated rate, interest became due ex lege from the time of payment, That construction of the letter of the 20th April appears to their Lordships to ignore the express obligation which it imposes upon the defendants to "settle accounts"and to pay the amount "which may be due" within the two months allowed for payment. These expressions plainly import that the sum specified in the letter merely represented the amount of their liability calculated to the 22nd April, and did not represent the sum payable by them at the date of actual settlement, which was to be ascertained by taking accounts, or, in other words, by making a new calculation so as to include interest accruing up to that date. The letter was applied for, and was given solely with the view of eluding the Statute of Limitations; and, in the opinion of their Lordships, it had as little effect in altering the quality of the debt constituted by the promissory note as would have been produced by a notice of the same date from the plaintiffs requiring payment within two months.