(1.) The plaintiff is the appellant before me in these three appeals which arise out of three analogous actions in ejectment. The facts lie within a short compass and may be stated as follows. The subject-matter of the three suits are three strips of land lying to the contiguous east of a road known as Railway Approach Road which itself runs north to south on the eastern side of the Comilla Railway Station compound. The case of the plaintiff District Board is that these as well as other lands were acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the Assam Bengal Railway Company who constructed a railway approach on a portion of the lands acquired. Later on, the Railway Company relinquished the approach road as well as the side lands which included the plots in suit in favour of the Government and the Government, in their turn, made over these lands to the District Board of Comilla under Section 74, Local Self-Government Act. The plaintiff Board has since then been exercising the right of control and administration over these properties as laid down in the Act. The disputed lands, it is said, consist mainly of low lands and ditches with some high lands here and there and in 1912 defendant 1 of Suits Nos. 327 and 328 on his own behalf as well as on behalf of his father took lease of the plots which are the subject-matter of these two suits for one year only promising to pay rents at the rate of Rs. 7 and Rs. 30 per year respectively. Likewise, the predecessor of defendants in Suit No. 359 took lease of the lands in that suit at an annual rental of Rs. 5. The tenants were all holding over after the expiry of this period. The plaintiff desiring to have the land for their own use served upon them notices to quit and as they did not vacate the lands in spite of the notices these suits were instituted.
(2.) The defence in all these three suits was practically the same. It was contended inter alia that the disputed lands were neither acquired by the Government nor were they relinquished by the Assam Bengal Railway Company to the Government and transferred subsequently by the latter to the plain-tiff. The plaintiff, it was said, had no title to the property and no right to institute these suits. The defendants denied that they were tenants under the plaintiff and their specific case was that the lands belonged to the Maharaja of Tippera whose tenants the defendants were and they had acquired occupancy rights in the lands in dispute by cultivating and possessing them for over 12 years. The learned Munsif who tried the suits came to the conclusion that with the exception of a small strip of land to the south, the rest of the disputed lands were included in the acquisition plan and they were, in fact, relinquished by the Assam Bengal Railway Company in favour of the Government and the Government subsequently made them over to the plaintiff District Board under Section 74, Local Self-Government Act. In the opinion of the Munsif, the plaintiff was entitled to hold the property as agent of the Government and in that capacity they had the right to institute the suits. The Munsif further found that the lands in suit were for the first time let out to the defendants or their predecessors by the plaintiff after the latter got control over them under S.74, Local Self- Government Act, and it was the plaintiff who inducted the defendants into these lands. The trial Court found however that the defendants were agricultural tenants who had acquired occupancy rights in the lands in suit and in this view of the case the suits were dismissed.
(3.) On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge concurred with the trial Court in holding that the tenancies came into existence after the plaintiff got these properties under Section 74, Local Self-Government Act, and he held also that it was the plaintiff by whom the defendants were let into possession. The Subordinate Judge held further disagreeing with the Munsif, that the tenancies were not for agricultural purposes. He however dismissed the suits on the ground that the suits for ejectment were not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff. In the opinion of the Subordinate Judge, a person who is not the owner is not entitled to institute a suit for eviction, and as the plaintiff on its own showing was the agent of the Government, the proper person to sue was the Government and not the District Board. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before me in second appeal. It cannot be disputed that a person suing another for khas possession must show a better title in him than the defendant, and he must establish that he has the present right to get possession of the property. It cannot be said however that none but an owner can maintain suit for ejectment. Dr. Sen Gupta who appears for the appellant argues that the control and the administration which the District Board obtained under Section 74, Local Self-Government Act, gave them sufficient right to the present possession of the property so as to entitle them to institute and maintain these suits for eviction even though the proprietary right remained vested in the Crown, Dr. Pal, on the other hand, contends that under Section 74, Local Self Government Act, the property can be placed under the control and administration of the District Board only for purposes of the Act, and it was not within the competence of the Board to let out these lands to the tenants.