KANAKLATA DASI Vs. RAM GOPAL DAS NASKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a rule directed against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Alipore by which he has called upon the plaintiffs to pay additional court-fees on a valuation of Rs. 36,975. The suit was instituted on 6 February 1939, by three family deities, collectively designated as plaintiff 1, and three other persons, plaintiffs 2 to 4, being the widow and two sons of one Heramba Gopal. These three persons claimed to be the shebaits of the idols and to represent them in the suit. The defendants were two brothers of Heramba. The plaintiffs ease is that one Ganesh Das Naskar had a son Kshetra Mohan who had pre-deceased him, leaving the two defendants and Heramba as his only sons and heirs. Ganesh and these three grandsons jointly executed an arpanama in favour of the family idols, whereby the three grandsons were appointed shebaits and each of them as shebait was given a remuneration at the rate of Rs. 1000 per annum. After Heramba's death, according to the plaintiffs, the shebaitship in his branch devolved upon plaintiffs 2, 3 and i. It was alleged that the defendants were guilty of mismanagement and misappropriation, and had thereby rendered themselves unfit to continue as shebaits. There was a further allegation that the defendants were claiming title to certain properties which had really been purchased with the debutter funds in denial of the right of the idols. These properties were separately described in schedule kha of the plaint, schedule ka containing a list of admittedly debutter properties. The plaint contained as many as twelve prayers, but in substance the reliefs asked for were : (1) a declaration that the properties in schedules ka and kha belong to the idols, (2) a further declaration that the plaintiffs are shebaits under the law, (3) removal of the defendants from shebaitship, (4) the framing of a scheme of management, (5) an injunction against the defendants restraining them from dealing with the properties in schedule kha as secular properties, and (6) accounts.

(2.) The plaintiffs valued the claim for accounts tentatively at Rs. 100, and the remaining reliefs at Rs. 2000, presumably treating the case as one under Section 7, para. (iv), Court- fees Act. On an objection taken by the defendants regarding the sufficiency of the court-fees, a preliminary issue was raised, and it is the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge on this issue which is the subject-matter of the present application. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the declaration of shebaiti right as prayed for by plaintiffs 2 to i entitled them to an allowance of Rs. 1000 per annum on the basis of the arpannama, and that in that view, court- fees were payable ad valorem in respect of this prayer on ten times the amount of this annuity. As regards the prayer for removal of the defendants from shebaitship, the learned Subordinate Judge said that as this would result in the deities being benefited yearly to the extent of Rs. 2000, the plaintiffs should also pay court fees on ten times this amount. Dealing with the prayer for injunction, he held that the relief claimed under this head should be valued at Rs. 6975 according to the valuation of the properties in schedule kha on the basis of net profits as found by him on evidence. In the result, the plaintiffs were directed to pay ad valorem court-fees in the suit on a total valuation of Rs. 36,975. As regards the prayer for accounts, the learned Judge accepted the tentative valuation as given by the plaintiffs.

(3.) On behalf of the plaintiffs it has been argued that the whole basis of valuation adopted by the learned Judge was wrong. We may say at once that so far as the injunction is concerned, we are satisfied that he has taken a substantially correct view. This clearly comes under clause (d) of para. (iv) of Section 7, Court-fees Act, and it was certainly open to the learned Judge to revise the valuation of this relief under Section 8C. There is nothing to show that in doing so he applied a wrong principle or a wrong objective standard such as would call for our interference. The matter, however, stands on a different footing as regards the other reliefs asked for. Mr. Das on behalf of the opposite party contended that the learned Judge dealt with these prayers also in the same way, treating the case as one under el. (c) of para. (iv) of Section 7, and that he was therefore similarly entitled to value the relief as he thought proper. Mr. Das sought to imply thereby that the question being one of pure valuation, this Court was not competent to interfere in revision. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine this matter. It might no doubt be contended with some show of reason that, in regard to these reliefs, the learned Judge did not mean to proceed on the basis suggested by Mr. Das. The fact that he called for court-fees on ten times the amount of the annuities which were payable to the shebaits under the terms of the arpannama could perhaps be relied upon to support a suggestion that he dealt with the matter under para. (ii) of Section 7, as if this was a suit to recover the annuities payable under the arpannama, and that the question would, therefore, not be one of valuation, but of classification, that is to say, of the category under which the suit fell. In our opinion, however, the suit was really one for a declaration with a prayer for consequential relief, coming under el. (c) of para. (iv) of Section 7, the declaration asked for being that the properties mentioned in the plaint were debutter and that the plaintiffs were shebaits. It was, therefore, open to the plaintiffs to put their own valuation, but such valuation would be subject to revision by the Court under the provisions of Section 8C. We agree with Mr. Das that this was the view accepted by the learned Judge, but we consider that while dealing with the case as one under el. (c) of para. (iv) of Section 7, he applied a wrong standard in determining the correct valuation under Section 8C, namely, the standard laid down in para. (ii) of Section 7, which is applicable to a different class of suits altogether, i. e., suits for maintenance and annuities and other periodical payments. It is this circumstance which in our opinion would attract the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115, Civil P.C.