MT BIBI RAM PIARAI Vs. DAYA SHANKER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiff's revision under Section 25, Small Cause Courts Act, from a decree dismissing her suit. The suit was for recovery of a sum of money on a bond dated 4 July 1934 which had been executed by the opposite party in favour of the applicant. The applicant had obtained a decree for arrears of rent against the opposite party, which the latter was apparently unable to pay; and by agreement between the parties a bond was executed under the terms of which the opposite party agreed to pay the decretal amount within four years in eight instalments. Pour of these instalments were duly paid, but the applicant was compelled to institute a suit for recovery of the remaining four instalments. The suit had been dismissed by the Court below. The view of the learned Judge is that by the subsequent passing of Acts 4 of 1937 and 18 of 1939 the consideration for the bond has failed, the intention of the Legislature being that all rents prior to rabi 1344 should be remitted.

(2.) Section.2 of Act 4 of 1937 provided inter alia that all suits for recovery of arrears of rent which had accrued prior to rabi 1344, instituted while the aforesaid section was in force, should be stayed for such period as the section remained in force. Section 8 of Act 18 of 1939 enacts inter alia that all suits for recovery of arrears of rent which had been stayed under the provisions of Act 4 of 1937 shall be dismissed. The last mentioned Act received the assent of the Governor on 30th January 1940 and the suit out of which this revision arises was instituted on 24th January 1940 while Act 4 of 1937 was in force. Act 4 of 1937 is entitled "U.P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act" and Act 18 of 1939 is entitled "U.P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act," and both these Acts relate to suits and proceedings in the revenue Courts. The intention of the Legislature in enacting Act 18 of 1939 was to remit arrears of rent which had accrued prior to rabi 1344 by barring their recovery in the revenue Courts. The provisions of the Act are therefore inapplicable to a suit on a contract in a civil Court unless they can be indirectly invoked by means of some other provision of the law. Learned Counsel for the applicant relies on Section 23, Contract Act, which provides that "the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless" inter alia, "it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law."

(3.) The contract was entered into, as I have already said, on 4 July 1934, several years before these two Acts were passed, and it cannot be said that the object or consideration of the agreement was at that time of; such a nature as would defeat the provisions of any law. The applicant was perfectly at liberty to execute his decree in the revenue Court in 1934; but, in lieu of doing so, he allowed the original contract to be novated by a bond, which provided for payment by eight instalments over a period of four years. The decree thus became unenforceable, a fresh contract having taken its place. Under; this contract the opposite party executed a bond in consideration for the applicant refraining from execution of his decree, which he could otherwise have lawfully taken out. There was nothing unlawful within the meaning of Section 23, Contract Act, in the consideration or object of that agreement and I do not see how it can possibly be affected by subsequent legislation barring a suit in the revenue Court for recovery of arrears of rent. Moreover, if the contract had not been novated in 1934, an application for execution would ordinarily have been barred by limition by 21st September 1937, the date on which Act 4 of 1937 came into force; and the Acts of 1937 and 1939 are not concerned with arrears of rent which are irrecoverable at law. In my judgment the view taken by the learned Judge is incorrect. I accordingly allow this application and set aside the decree of the Court below and I decree the-suit with costs in both Courts.