MT DIRJI Vs. SMTGOALIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts material to this appeal are that Fakir Das having died as a result of an accident arising out of his employment, a sum of Rs. 630 was due to be paid to his dependants under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The claimants were Mt. Dirji, the wife of the deceased, and one Mt. Srimati. Srimati alleged that she was the step-mother of the deceased and dependent on him. The Commissioner has found that Srimati was partly dependant on the deceased, but has not found whether she was his step-mother, as she alleged, or the mistress of the father of the deceased as the appellant alleged. He has awarded Rs. 420 of the compensation money to Dirji and Rs. 2lo to Srimati. If the step-mother is not a dependant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d), Workmen's Compensation Act, the appellant's claim to the whole of the compensation available must be allowed and it will not be necessary to remand the case for a finding whether Mt. Srimati was, in fact, the step-mother of the deceased. It was conceded by the learned advocate for the appellant that no appeal lies in this case as the amount in dispute is only Rs. 210 and the first proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act provides that no appeal shall lie where the amount in dispute is Rs. 300 or less. We were asked, therefore, to treat the memorandum of appeal as an application in revision. The first question which then arose was whether the Commissioner is a Court. This question was referred to a Pull Bench and it has been decided that the Commissioner is a Court. See ( 41) A.I.R. 1941 Pat. (F.B.).28.

(2.) The learned advocate for the opposite party now contends that even though the Commissioner be a Court he is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, Civil P.C. A Court over which the High Court has appellate jurisdiction is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court: Balkrishna Daji V/s. Collector Bombay Suburban ( 23) 10 A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 290 at p. 701. Section 30, Workmen's Compensation Act, provides for an appeal to the High Court where the amount in dispute is over Rs. 300. The Commissioner is, therefore, subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and is a Court subordinate to the High Court. It was next contended on behalf of the opposite party that, assuming that the Commissioner be subordinate to this Court, he had jurisdiction to decide whether Mt. Srimati was a "dependant" of the deceased and his decision is, therefore, not open to revision. Section 2(1)(d) of the Act defines specifically the persons who are to be considered as dependants for the purpose of the Act. The Commissioner has no jurisdiction to decide that the persons designated in the section are not dependants or that persons not designated in the section are dependants. This is a matter which has been decided by the Legislature. What the Commissioner has power to decide is whether a particular person has the status of any of the persons referred to in the section. In the present case he had power to decide this and has failed to exercise that power.

(3.) The question whether the step-mother is a dependant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) is one of difficulty. The definition comprises two classes. In the first class are included certain near relations of the deceased and these are designated as dependents whether in fact they are dependant on the earnings of the workman or not. The second class includes persons less closely related to the deceased. The right of these persons to share in the compensation payable under the Act is made contingent on their having been dependent on the earnings of the deceased, at the time of his death. The first class includes a "widowed mother" and the second class includes a "parent other than a widowed mother." The question to be decided, therefore, is whether the term mother or parent includes a step-mother or a step, parent. Neither of these terms has been defined in the Act or in the General Clauses Act. The ordinary dictionary meaning of parent is "one who begets." Prima facie, therefore, a step-parent is not included in the term parent. In defining the term the Legislature has proceeded with minute particularity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate offspring and married and unmarried daughters. It may be supposed, therefore, that if the term mother or parent was intended to include a stepmother or a step-parent this would have been specifically provided for. Among those who are included in the class of persons who are dependants within the meaning of the Act if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death are a minor illegitimate son and an unmarried illegitimate daughter. If we are to read mother and parent as including a step-mother and a step-parent we should also logically have to include a minor illegitimate step-son and an unmarried illegitimate step-daughter, although there appears to be no reason why any part of the compensation payable in respect of a workman's death should go to the illegitimate children born of his wife before their marriage. Then again, where a deceased leaves no parent, a paternal grandparent is included in the term dependant. I see no justification for holding that the paternal step grandparent should have a claim on compensation payable in respect of the death of the deceased, or that a step-mother is included in the term "mother." This was also the view taken in Manada Debi V/s. Bengal Bone Mill ( 40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 Cal. 285, although no reasons are there given for the decision.