(1.) THIS order disposes of Civil Revisions Nos. 490 of 1940, 587 of 1940, 63 of 1941, 64 of 1941 and 116 of 1941. This group of civil revisions is one of a large number of civil revisions which, we understand, have been filed and await the decision of the question whether the High Court has power to hear revision applications from decisions of the District Courts made under Section 20, Belief of Indebtedness Act, 1939. As the point is of importance we have heard counsel not only on the civil revisions before us but as amicus curiae in relation to the revisions that are not before us. They all raise the same point and we thought it desirable to hear all senior counsel who had any point to put before us that would help in elucidating a very obscure statutory provision. The main argument was addressed to us by Mr. Sen who was counsel in Civil Revision No. 64 of 1941. His argument, as usual, is helpful and exhaustive of all possible points. It ranged over a wide field and can be summarized as follows:
(2.) QUITE apart from any statutory power, a High Court has power to consider judicially the decisions of Courts over which it is given power of superintendence. The High Court is given power of superintendence over District Courts. Wherever you find a District Court authorized to entertain judically any subject of dispute its decision is revisable. Secondly, assuming that the above is too widely stated, one proceeds to the narrower power given by Section 115, Civil P.C. That section gives the power to revise the decision of any Court subordinate to the High Court. The District Court is subordinate to a High Court. Thirdly, the power conferred by Section 115 is not a power dependant upon the act of a litigant but is one residing in the High Court itself which may suo motu call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court. Therefore, quite apart from any application that may be made or can be made by a litigant the High Court may, of its own motion, call for the record of any case before a Debt Belief Court, at least where the case has gone to the District Court, and see whether it has in fact been dealt with in accordance with law.
(3.) ALL the above questions are of the type which it behoves a Court to be slow to deal with unless it is necessary for the determination of the question before it; and they do not, in our opinion, arise if on the true construction of the Act (the Relief of Indebtedness Act) the power of revision, granted that it existed under any of the above heads, has been expressly or by necessary implication taken away. The section under examination is an example of extremely loose drafting. We must not, however, be understood as importing censure on the draftsman. This Court has, on many occasions, felt itself bound to animadvert on the drafting of certain local Acts It must however in fairness to the draftsman, be observed that as a rule the local, Acts in question cut so sharply across all ideas of law and legal principle that it is exceedingly difficult to cast their provisions in a form that is not open to criticism. All sorts of unexpected traps are waiting for the draftsman of an Act dealing with litigation where that Act is creating a new forum, a new mode of approach, new procedure, new principles, and is shutting out or endeavouring to shut out the parties from the ordinary Courts.