LAWS(PVC)-1941-1-98

RABINDRA NATH CHAKRAVARTY Vs. GIRINDRA MOHAN BHADURI

Decided On January 06, 1941
RABINDRA NATH CHAKRAVARTY Appellant
V/S
GIRINDRA MOHAN BHADURI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question in this rule is one of court-fee payable on a plaint. The suit is one for administration, and has been instituted by the plaintiff in his capacity as executor. He not only asks for construction of the will and administration of the estate, but also prays for accounts and partition and for a number of other incidental reliefs, mainly in the nature of directions from the Court as to how the estate is to be distributed. The defendants say that the suit is a mala fide one, and is only a device to get round a distribution of the legacies already effected in pursuance of an award in a private arbitration among the various legatees and beneficiaries, and that it is also an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to escape payment of certain amounts for which he has made himself personally liable. We are not, however, concerned with the merits of the case at this stage, but must proceed on the allegations in the plaint. The plaintiff has paid a total court-fee of Rs. 86-4-0 on the plaint in respect of the various reliefs claimed, made up as follows: (i) Rs. 15 for construction of the will and administration, (ii) Rs. 56-4-0 for accounts on a provisional valuation for Rs. 485, and (iii) Rs. 15 for partition. So far as item (i) is concerned, it is stated that the fee is paid under Clause (vi) of Art. 17 of Schedule 2, Court-fees Act, which provides for a fixed fee of Rs. 15 for a suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by the Act. A similar fee is also paid in respect of item (iii), presumably under the same provision, while the fee under (ii) is an ad valorem fee paid under Clause (f) of para, (iv) of Section 7, being subject to payment of an additional fee in case the amount due is found to exceed the amount claimed. As regards the claim for construction of the will and administration, it is further stated that for determining the court-fee and the jurisdiction of the Court the claim is laid at Rs. 4,34,611.

(2.) An issue was raised on the question of court-fees, and this was decided first on 31 July 1940. The learned Subordinate Judge, in whose Court the suit was instituted, found that court-fees paid were sufficient. It is this order which one of the defendants challenges in this rule. No question is raised as regards the fee paid on the claim for accounts, but the dispute is in respect of the other two items. The points urged by Mr. Das on behalf of the petitioner were as follows: (i) that the suit was not merely one for administration but also for partition, and as according to the plaintiff's own case he was out of possession, he should have paid ad valorem court-fees according to the value of the subject-matter in dispute; (ii) that treating the suit as one for administration, it is still in essence a suit for accounts, and hence comes under Section 7, para. (iv), Clause (f); the court-fee should accordingly be payable on the valuation put by the plaintiff himself on the relief claimed, such valuation being the same both for purposes of jurisdiction and for court-fees under Section 8, Suits Valuation Act. The valuation here having been given as Rs. 4,34,611 the court-fee should have been paid ad valorem on this basis. The learned Subordinate Judge does not appear to have considered the first point at all. As regards the second, the order (unless the certified copy is wrong) speaks with an uncertain sound. In one place he says quite explicitly that the relief claimed in respect of construction and administration was incapable of valuation, and that the case, therefore, fell under Clause (vi) of Art. 17 of Schedule 2, so that a fixed fee of Rs. 15 would be the proper fee to pay. But in another part of the order he seems to suggest that the suit is one under Section 7, para. (iv), Clause (f), which means an ad valorem fee according to the amount at which the plaintiff values the relief sought, and he also goes on to deal with the contention under Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, which, as the section itself shows, would arise only if ad valorem court- fees were payable. The learned Subordinate Judge's interpretation of this section is as follows: The meaning of Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, is that the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall follow the value to be given for purposes of court-fees, not vice versa: Court-fees Act, In the matter of ( 30) 17 AIR 1930 Cal 686.

(3.) "No doubt in this case," he says, the suit was valued at Rs. 4, 34,611 for purposes of jurisdiction, but it shall follow the value given for purposes of court-fees.