MANIK CHANDRA SADHU KHAN Vs. GOUR KRISHNA PRAMANIK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised in this appeal is whether a certain compromise petition which formed part of a decree requires registration. The appellants, who are the defendants, cannot pretend that they are not attempting to evade the compromise which they made with the plaintiff. The relevant part of the petition is contained in paras. 2 and 3. The former provides that the rent will be Rs. 3-4-0. The latter provides that the defendants will not be able to construct pucca roofs without the plaintiff's permission. The defendants are bound to fail unless it can be said that this compromise had the legal effect of creating a new lease. If the case comes within Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, the document clearly does not require registration. In the first place, it cannot be said that the new rights created were of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards. The lease is one under the Transfer of Property Act. The rent could not be altered anyhow and the provision in Clause 2 is worth nothing whatever. There is no evidence to show what is the value of the limitation of the defendants" rights to the construction of pucca walls only. Then in the second place, the case would com(c) within Sub-section 2 (vi). The learned Subordinate Judge was obviously right when he: said that the document does not purport to create a new lease. Obviously, it does not. It implies that the original lease is still in force. Paragraph 3 varies the terms by either cutting down the right of the defendants to erect pucca structures or limiting the right of the plaintiff to object to such construction. Mr. Sen accordingly contended that where the terms of a lease are-altered by a compromise, a new lease is automatically created. In support of that proposition he relied upon the decision in the case in Nazar Ali V/s. Indra Kumar . Undoubtedly, in that case the terms of the lease between the parties were altered. The learned Judges staid this: It is therefore impossible to escape from the conclusion that the solenama created a new lease in respect of land which the defendant held from before.

(2.) Now, it is not clear whether the learned Judges intended to hold that in that particular case the parties agreed to give up the old lease and create a new one or whether they intended to lay down that the variation in the terms would automatically lead to the creation of a new lease under the law. There is certainly nothing in the words used in the judgment to warrant such a proposition. In a later case in Haladhar Pathak V/s. Madan Mohan my learned brother Mukherjea held that there would be no such automatic result. He said this: On the face of the solenama, it is difficult to say whether it, in fact, creates a fresh lease or not. It may be that it simply varied the existing rent without doing anything more, or it may be that certain other terms were varied and practically a fresh lease was entered into.

(3.) Finally, I need only observe that the present case is really of a different character. There was a dispute between the parties as to what their respective rights under the lease were, and the compromise petition did nothing more than express an agreement that the lease would be interpreted in a particular way. There is nothing to suggest that in such a case an agreement as to the meaning of a lease would itself be the creation of a new lease. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.