(1.) This is an appeal against an order striking off an application for execution on the ground that it was time barred. At the time the application came up before me for determination as to whether it was a fit application to be admitted for hearing I expressed my grave doubts as to its fitness at the time. I however admitted the application for hearing because it seemed then, though not now, cognate to those cases in which the bona fides of an application for execution has been considered when determining whether a subsequent application was barred by limitation. My own view and that of Banerji, J., as to the propriety of considering the bona fides of a previous application when determining the question of limitation had been overruled by a Bench of three Judges. I was therefore loath to refuse admission to this appeal unless I was satisfied that such refusal would be in no way in conflict with that Full Bench decision.
(2.) There can in fact be no doubt but that in this case the previous application for execution was not made bona fide and was allowed to go by default. If that were the only point there can be no doubt that the case would be governed by the Full Bench decision to which I have referred, the bona fides or otherwise of the previous application being of necessity, in view of the Full Bench decision to be held immaterial. I therefore ignore that aspect of the previous application altogether.
(3.) The present appeal however must fail on a totally different ground, namely, that the previous application was not in accordance with law, and that cannot now be challenged.