MUSAMMAT KETKI KUNWAR Vs. BSHEO NARAIN JAFA,

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Notices have been issued to Sheo Narain Jafa, a Pleader of Budaun, Ghasa Singh and Nathu Lal to show cause why a complaint should not be filed against them in a Criminal Court charging them with having committed offences under Secs.193, 120 (b) and 209, read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Notice was also issued to Makhan Singh to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for having committed offences punishable under Secs.120 (b) and 209, read with Section 109, of the Indian Penal Code.

(2.) These applications arose out of F. A. No. 147 of 1927, which was heard and decided by a Bench of this Court on the 22nd January, 1931. That Bench made very strong observations against all the four respondents. The Court found in the civil appeal that there had been a conspiracy by all of them to deprive one Manohar Singh of his property, and, in accordance with that finding avoided a deed of gift executed by Manohar Singh in favour of Nathu Lal and Makhan Singh, and also a sale-deed executed by the same parties. The Court also set aside the decree of the 12 November, 1923 in Suit No. 201 of 1923, which was a suit by Nathu Lal and Makhan Lal against Manohar Singh for a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the property comprised in the said sale deed. The facts arising in this case are fully set out in the judgment of this High Court in F. A. No. 147 of 1927, and it is unnecessary for us to detail fully those facts again. We have to consider whether there is a prima facie case established against all or any of the respondents which would make it obligatory on us to order their prosecution under Section 476, coupled with Section 195, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Counsel appearing on behalf of Sheo Narain Jafa did not take any preliminary objection : but Counsel on behalf of the others have objected that this Court has no jurisdiction to order the prosecution of their clients. The objection is based upon e. 195 of the Criminal P. C.. That section enacts that "no Court shall take cognizance, (Sub-clause b), of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, se. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 217, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any proceedings in any Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate." With the exception of Section 120 (a), the sections comprised in this notice are included in Sub-clause (b) of Section 195. Clause (4) also bring in the Clause (1) (b) the charge under Section 120 (b). It is clear that the alleged offences were not committed in this Court, and it is contended therefore that this Court has no jurisdiction to order the prosecution of the respondents. It is, however, to be noted that the sub-clause does not apply merely to offences committed in "such Court", but apply also to offences "committed in relation to any proceeding in any Court". It is obvious that the offences charged under Section 209, read with Section 109, was not committed even in the trial Court. It cannot be denied that that offence was committed in relation to the proceeding in the trial Court, It is, therefore, in our opinion also clear that the offence under those sections was also committed in relation to the appeal which was heard in this Court. There is no reason to construe narrowly the words "in relation to". Equally the offence of perjury, although it was undoubtedly committed in the trial Court, must, in our view be held to have been committed in relation to the appeal in this Court. A person committing perjury in a trial Court must be held to have intended that his perjury should not only influence the proceedings in the trial Court but also subsequent proceedings which might take place if either party to the case in the trial Court took the matter to appeal.

(3.) Further, on this point it is not denied that there was, before Act V of 1898 was passed, a jurisdiction in the High Court to order prosecutions in a matter like this. The equivalent section of Act X of 1882 undoubtedly gave jurisdiction to this Court to order prosecutions. The High Court has also directed similar prosecutions even prior to the specific enactment of Act X of 1882. There was, therefore, at the time of the passing of Act V of 1898 an existing jurisdiction in the High Court to order such prosecutions. Therefore, in construing the material Section of Act V of 1898 the cardinal rule of construction as to jurisdiction must be taken into account, and that is, that no existing jurisdiction of a supreme Court can be taken away unless the language used in the enactment which purports to take that jurisdiction away is in the clearest possible terms. There can have been no object in cutting down the jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters, and at any rate, it cannot possibly be said that Section 195 (b) takes away in clear terms the undoubted jurisdiction which existed in the High Court prior to the passing of that Act. We hold, therefore, that this Court has jurisdiction to make the orders.