LAWS(PVC)-1931-4-37

LAKSHMAN VITHOBA NAIK Vs. MAHABLESHWAR DODA BHAT

Decided On April 15, 1931
LAKSHMAN VITHOBA NAIK Appellant
V/S
MAHABLESHWAR DODA BHAT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a reference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act from the Small Causes Court at B, and the question raised is an interesting point of law arising under the Indian Limitation Act. The suit is against the sons of the original debtor, the liability sought to be imposed being in respect of the pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his father's debts, The question which arises is from what period the Indian Limitation Act runs as against the son, and which Art. of the Act applies.

(2.) Now the facts are that on June 13, 1923, the father gave a promissory note for Rs. 130 odd with interest, On June 1, 1926, the father repaid part of the money owing and acknowledged that on that date Rs. 100 was owing on the promissory note. The effect of that acknowledgment was, at any rate as against the father, to start a fresh period of limitation running from June 1, 1926. The father died in June 1928, and on June 1, 1929, the last date on which a suit could be brought against the father, the plaintiff sued the father on the promissory note in the Small Causes Court, presumably in ignorance of the fact that the father was dead. That suit failed because the father was dead and therefore there was no defendant. On August 14, 1929, this suit was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendants as the sons of the maker of the promissory note and it is sought to make them liable to the extent to which they have inherited joint family property. The way in which the case is put by Mr. Murdeshwar for the petitioner is this. He says that originally under the promissory note there would be a period of limitation of three years against the father under Art. 73; but that inasmuch as the liability of the sons does not arise under the promissory note, there is no Art. of the Indian Limitation Act directly applying to the sons, and therefore the case falls under Art. 120 and the period against the sons is six years. And then he says that the effect of the acknowledgment by the father on June 1, 1926, was to extend the period against the father for another three years, and to extend the period against the sons for another six years.

(3.) The first point to notice is that as against the father the claim on the promissory note was barred at the date of commencement of this suit, because under Art. 73 of the Indian Limitation Act the period is three years, and three years had expired from the date of the acknowledgment. There are decisions of three High