(1.) The plaintiff sued the Municipality of Thana by its President, the Municipal Secretary, and the Sanitary Inspector for damages for malicious prosecution for unauthorisedly rebuilding his house. The First Class Subordinate Judge of Thana dismissed the suit. The plaintiff a
(2.) The record of this case is voluminous, and the arguments have taken a considerable time. But there is no dispute as to the actual facts, and once the issues of law have been disposed of, the case seems to me to depend on a few salient facts, and many of the details may be omitted. The facts put briefly are, the plaintiff purchased a house in Thana. He applied in March 1922 for the house being entered in his name and for permission to make certain repairs and alterations. This was refused, The Municipality later on in July said that permission was refused because the house was in the regular line. The Municipality also thought of acquiring the house or portions of it for the purpose of widening the street, but nothing came of that. After various representations by the plaintiff, to some of which no answer is given, the plaintiff made certain repairs and alterations, as a result of which the Municipality resolved to prosecute him, and a criminal complaint was filed against him on Match 23, 1923. The plaintiff was acquitted by a majority of the Bench Magistrates on July 17, 1928. He gave a notice to the Municipality under Section 167 of the Bombay District Municipal Act on January 7, 1924, and the present suit is instituted on February 16, 1924. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit against defendants Nos. 2 and 3, the Municipal Secretary and the Sanitary Inspector, was bad for want of notice, but the suit was barred by limitation, and that it was not proved that the charge was preferred without any reasonable cause and maliciously. He accordingly dismissed the suit.
(3.) So far as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, I agree with the Subordinate Judge that the absence of notice to them under Section 167 of the Bombay District Municipal Act is a bar to the suit, nor has this point been pressed by the learned advocate for the appellant. Apart from this, the prosecution having been admittedly instituted after resolution of the Municipality, defendants NOS. 2 and 3, who are merely servants, cannot be held responsible for it: cf. Town Mun. of Jambusar V/s. Girjashankar (1905) 7 Bom. L.R. 655. As against defendants Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, the suit is rightly dismissed, and the appeal fails, and must be dismissed with costs,