(1.) In this case, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State for India in Council in respect of two consignments of jute which they delivered to the railway at Poradah station for carriage to Cossipore Road station, both these stations being outside the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court. It was found, according to the plaint, that the jute had been damaged by fire on 21 March 1927 and the plaintiffs sued for a sum of Rs. 11,000 putting their case as of damages, first of all, for the railway's failure to deliver the jute and, secondly, for the misconduct of the railway in not taking reasonable care of it. The defendant, the Secretary of State for India in Council, having been served with the writ of summons took out a summons dated 9 April 1930 requiring the plaintiffs to attend before the Judge for an order that the " leave granted under Clause 12, Letters Patent, to file the plaint in the above suit in this Hon ble Court be revoked and that the plaint be taken off the file."
(2.) Now, it appears that this application was put upon two grounds. First of all,, it was said that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because the Secretary of State for India in Council did not carry on business within the jurisdiction and no part of the plaintiffs cause of action arose within the jurisdiction; and secondly, it was said that the plaintiffs claim was barred by limitation being governed by Art. 30 or Art. 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of one year for the purpose of bringing a suit.
(3.) I do not doubt that in a proper case an application to revoke the leave granted under Clause 12, Letters Patent, may be entertained by the Court. I do not doubt also that, in a case where the] plaint discloses a clear case of the suit! being barred under the Limitation Act, it is open to a party to treat the suit as one which ought never to have been brought and ask the Court acting under Order 7, Civil P.C., to take the plaint off the file and return it to the plaintiff for amendment. In this case, the parties! when they got before the learned Judge appear to have laid before him and entered into a discussion on several extremely difficult and far- reaching questions--questions which, to my way of thinking may turn out--I do not say they do--to depend upon facts or are at least questions of mixed fact and law.