(1.) On this appeal being called on, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that the appeal was incompetent as no appeal lay from the Land Acquisition Court, when that Court, as in this case, was constituted by the appointment of a "Special Judicial Officer." The objection is founded upon alternative arguments, viz., (1) either the Chief judge of the Small Cause Court who was the "Special Judicial Officer" appointed in this case (see Local Rules and Orders, p. 84) is a persona designata so as to make the Court he constitutes fall within no general class from which appeal to the High Court lies, or (2) by virtue of the fact that the "Special Judicial Officer" appointed was in this case the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court, the Court he constitutes falls within the class of Small Cause Courts and accordingly in that case also no appeal lies to the High Court.
(2.) In our view in this case "the Court" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act was constituted by the Local Government appointing a Special Judicial Officer to perform the functions of the Court. It follows, therefore, that this was a Special Court and was not "a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 3 (d) of the Land Acquisition Act. The question then arises whether when the-. matter in dispute and litigated before such a Court leads not to the making of an award but to the pronouncement of a decree, any appeal lies to the High (Court from the decree of such a Court.
(3.) Before, however, we consider this matter, it is necessary to advert to the meaning of the term "award" as used in the Land Acquisition Act and to consider whether the Trial Court in this matter made an award or issued a decree.