SRIMATH JAGATHGURU SRINGERI SRI SATCHITHANANTHA CHANDRASEKHARA BHARATI SWAMIGAL BY AGENT T C NATARAJA MUDALI Vs. CPDURAISWAMI NAIDU (DEAD)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the plaintiff has sued to recover from the defendant about six acres of land in the village of Chinnamapet with damages. The plaintiff granted a lease of the whole village of Chinnamapet to the defendant as an inamdar for eight years in 1911. After the expiry of that term the defendant surrendered the whole village to the plaintiff with the exception of the six acres with which we are now concerned. On these six acres during the period of his lease the defendant had himself planted casuarina trees, and he claimed the right to remain in possession of that area as an occupancy ryot. The District Munsif of Sholinghur, who heard the suit, found that the defendant was not a ryot but a trespasser and made a decree for the plaintiff for the recovery of possession with Rs. 20 as damages and subsequent mesne profits to be fixed later. Against that decree both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the District Judge, the plaintiff claiming that the damages awarded to him were insufficient and the defendant objecting to the whole decree. It has been found by the District Judge that the village of Chinnamapet is an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, and that finding has not been disputed before us. It is also not now disputed that the land upon which the defendant planted his casuarina trees is ryoti land. The District Judge found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in this case and returned the plaint for presentation to a Revenue Court. Against that order the plaintiff now appeals.

(2.) The only contention which has been urged before us on his behalf is that the defendant, although he has been occupying ryoti land in an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, is not a ryot because he has not held the land for the purpose of agriculture, and, that being so, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded. It is not suggested that the defendant holds his land for any other purpose than for his casuarina plantation, and, as was decided recently by my learned brother and Wallace, J. in Venugopala Rice Mill V/s. Rajah of Pittapuram (1929) I.L.R. 53 M. 367 : 59 M.L.J. 74, even if a man holds ryoti land in an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act, he is not a ryot unless he holds it for agricultural purposes. The question we have to decide in this appeal is whether growing casuarina trees, that is trees for fuel, is an agricultural purpose so as to make the person who holds the land for that purpose a ryot within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. It has been pointed out to us for the defendant that, after he had surrendered the rest of the village to the plaintiff, the plaintiff accepted rent from him for the land on which these casuarina trees stand for one fasli and gave him a receipt, Ex. I, which refers to "payment of kist made by the ryot" and that the plaintiff also sent him a notice, Ex. B, on the following day saying that he might retain the land up to the end of the following fasli and should then surrender it, incidentally mentioning that the defendant was "cultivating it and had planted casuarina trees thereon". I do not think we can decide this question, whether the growing of casuarina trees as fuel is an agricultural purpose, on the language used by the plaintiff either in Ex. 1 or in Ex. B. It is a legal question which affects the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, and that can certainly not be determined by the language which the plaintiff happens to have used in those documents.

(3.) I agree with the remark of Shephard, J., in Murugesa Chetti V/s. Chinnathambi Goundan (1901) I.L.R. 24 M. 421 that a man who plants or maintains trees for firewood is not in ordinary parlance an agriculturist. If we take the strict meaning of "agriculture" according to its derivation", it means the cultivation of a field, the cultivation of an open space, as opposed to horticulture, the cultivation of a comparatively small enclosed space. The cultivation either of the field in agriculture or of the garden in horticulture cannot be confined, I think, to any particular product. With great respect I do not agree with the opinion of Bhashyani Aiyangar, J., in Murugesa Chetti V/s. Chinnathambi Goundan (1901) I.L.R. 24 M. 421 that agriculture implies production of things useful as food for man or beast or other products fit for human consumption by way of luxury. That appears to me to be too narrow an interpretation. Still less do I agree with the opinion expressed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Rajah of Venkatagiri V/s. Ayyappareddi (1913) I.L.R. 38 M. 738 : 25 M.L.J. 578, that agriculture is confined to the production of grain crops. I can see no reason why the cultivation in open spaces of such useful products as cotton, jute, flax and hemp should not be agriculture. Indeed, I think agriculture cannot be defined by the nature of the products cultivated but should be defined rather by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on. In some cases it has been suggested that agriculture is confined to tillage. I think it can easily be shown that agriculture was carried on in this world before ploughs were invented. In the present day in many places cultivation is done with spades and not with ploughs. But the planting of timber or firewood trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years forming plantations or woods or forests, appears to me to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first to prepare the land. Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the young plants. Still later it may be necessary to thin out the plantation. But, when the land is covered with trees which have to stand on it for a number of years, sometimes as long as a century, during most of which period the land itself is untouched, to describe that as agriculture appears to me inappropriate. To my mind it is something very different from the cultivation of a field or of an open space. It may be noticed that in Kesho Prasad Singh V/s. Sheo Pragash Ojah (1924) L.R. 51 I.A. 381 : I.L.R. 46 A. 831 : 47 M.L.J. 824 (P.C) their Lordships of the Privy Council approve of the opinion expressed by two learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court that land let for a grove was not let for an agricultural purpose. It happened that the case then under consideration was one arising under the Agra Tenancy Act. But in that Act there is no definition of "agriculture". Therefore, both the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court and their Lordships of the Privy Council were, we may take it, considering what is the meaning of the word "agriculture" in its general sense. I may mention also that in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras V/s. Manavedan Tirumalpad (1930) I.L.R. 54 M. 21: 59 M.L.J. 265 (F.B.) a Full Bench, of this Court remarked that income from cutting timber was not agricultural income.