(1.) This is an application for the revision of an order of the Sessions Judge of Benares upholding the Magistrate's order in which he convicted the applicant Arjun Singh of an offence under Section 193, I. P.C. The question raised here is what is to be the standard of proof in a case of perjury where the accused is not charged with two mutually contradictory statements one of which must be false but with making statements that must be proved to be false by other evidence. The circumstances out; of which this case arose are one Santokhi a resident of Jaunpur District, together with another was sued in Rangoon in the Small Cause Court on the basis of a promissory note and a decree was obtained against him in Rangoon. Santokhi filed a suit in Jaunpur to set aside this decree on the ground that it had been obtained against him by fraud, alleging that he had never been to Rangoon and did not execute the promissory note and that Raghunandan of his village who was an enemy of his had caused this false suit to be instituted and an ex parte decree obtained against him. Part of his case was that he had never heard of the decree until it was executed against him, and that he had not received a summons showing that the suit had been instituted. He succeeded in establishing this case in the trial Court, the decree of which was upheld in first and second appeal.
(2.) The present applicant Arjun Singh made two statements in the course of this proceeding for which he had been prosecuted. Those statements are: (1) Santokhine samman nehin liya inkar kar dia. (2)Santokhi Rangoon char punch sal tale raha hai.
(3.) The evidence for the prosecution was the statement of Santokhi that he had never been to Rangoon and that he had never been shown the summons and the circumstantial evidence arising out of the proceedings in which Santokhi had had the fraudulent decree set aside. He was convicted by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge has gone into the matter fully and has upheld the order. The case for the applicant which has been argued with force and ability by Mr. K. D. Malaviya is that the Courts were wrong in accepting the testimony of one witness as the sole basis for a charge of perjury. A reference has been made in the first place to the dictum of Lord Coleridge in Regina V/s. Yates [1841-42] Car. & M. 132 at p. 139 The rule that the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to sustain an indictment for perjury is not a mere technical rule but a rule founded on substantial justice; and evidence confirmatory of that one witness, in some slight particulars only is not sufficient to warrant a conviction...