LAWS(PVC)-1931-4-72

GANUGOLA MALLAYYA Vs. GUDIMETLA BAPI REDDI

Decided On April 09, 1931
GANUGOLA MALLAYYA Appellant
V/S
GUDIMETLA BAPI REDDI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question I have to decide is, whether a daughter of a Hindu succeeding to his property can alienate it for raising money to perform her son's marriage, her husband (i.e., the boy's father) being too poor to meet the expenses.

(2.) The facts may be shortly stated. One Pattenna died leaving his widow Atchamma and his daughter Saramma. The property first devolved upon Atchamma and on her death on Saramma, On the 19 of March, 1905, she granted a mortgage, Ex. XIV, in favour of one Samaldas. The deed of mortgage was executed not only by Saramma but by her husband Bhadriah and her son Veerachari. Samaldas filed Suit No. 671 of 1906 to enforce his mortgage, impleading to his action as defendants, (1) his mortgagors, (2) Surayya, brother of Veerachari, and (3) the sons of one Kanchiah, the deceased brother of the last mentioned person. A decree was passed against the mortgagors alone (i.e., Saramma, Bhadriah and Veerachari) and the suit was dismissed as against the other defendants. The mortgaged property was brought to sale in execution of the decree and was purchased in 1911 by one Veerabrahmam, who, in his turn, sold it to the 2nd defendant. Saramgia died in 1923 and her sons having pre-deceased her, the 1 defendant, her husband's nephew, became, on her death, the reversioner entitled to the estate, and he, ignoring the Court sale, sold the property to the plaintiff, who has instituted the present suit for the recovery of the item, and his claim is resisted by the appellant, the 2nd defendant.

(3.) The consideration for the mortgage is the discharge of certain debts due under two promissory notes, which had previously been executed by Saramma in favour of Samaldas, the mortgagee. It is unnecessary to trace back these debts to their origin, for the only question that is material is, do the debts represent, as alleged by the defence, amounts borrowed for the marriage of Veerachari? The Trial Court has answered this question in the affirmative. It has also held that the purpose for which the mortgage was granted was one binding upon the reversioner. On these two points, the learned Subordinate Judge has come to a conclusion different from that of the Trial Court. His decision, in my opinion, cannot be supported.