NANDULA JAGANNADHAM Vs. GOTETI VIGNESWARADU (DEAD)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this appeal we have to decide whether a certain alienation made by a Hindu widow is binding on the reversioner. One Manikya Rao died on the 4 January, 1919, leaving the 1 defendant, then a minor, his widow. On the 26 September, 1920, her father, the 2nd defendant, agreed on her behalf, to sell the suit house to the 3 defendant for Rs. 3,200. This agreement was made subject to the widow's confirmation on her attaining majority. After she became a major, in pursuance of that contract, she executed on the 16 February, 1922, a conveyance of the property in favour of the 3 defendant. The price mentioned in the sale deed is Rs. 3,770-5-0, which, ignoring a certain small item, represents the sum mentioned in the contract (namely, Rs. 3,200) together with the interest thereon to the date of the sale. The fact was, that the vendee was put in possession of the property on the date of the agreement and he was, on that account, required, in lieu of the profits received by him, to pay interest on the amount originally fixed as the price. For deciding the question raised, the price must therefore be taken to have been Rs. 3,200.

(2.) The Lower Court has set aside the sale, but has declared in favour of the 3rd defendant a charge over the property in question for Rs. 3,200, the price paid. From this decree he appeals. His case was, that the sale was made for the purpose of necessity. Rs. 3,000 out of the consideration went in full discharge of a mortgage of 1916 and a balance of Rs. 200 in part payment of another mortgage of 1918. Both these mortgages were those executed by the 1 defendant's husband, and that the debts were accordingly binding on the inheritance is not disputed. The plaintiff attacks the sale by saying, that the debts could have been paid off with the income from the estate. He contends that the rents for 1918, which accrued due during Manikya Rao's life-time, must have been received subsequent to his death. It is unnecessary to decide whether his contention is correct, that a Hindu widow has no absolute power of disposal over the income which accrued due during her husband's life-time. For, it has not been shown that in point of fact such income was available to the 1 defendant. The learned Judge does not find that she was in possession of the income for 1918. He merely observes that she must have been in possession of such income. Nor is it sufficient to suggest that she received the rents; what must be shown is, that, after allowing for the expenses of the previous year, there was a balance left in her hands, available for the payment of the debts. On the contrary, it appears clearly that Manikya Rao was borrowing money for household expenses even some time prior to his death. It is likely that for the expenses incurred during his life-time, the widow had to make payments. We are not, therefore, prepared to assume that she had at her disposal any unexpended rents of the year 1918 and was thus in a position to pay off any part of the debts with such rents. It is next contended, that by the date of the sale, the widow came into possession of some considerable income and that it being incumbent upon her to pay off her husband's debts with such income, she was not competent to sell any part of the estate. The question raised is, whether a Hindu widow is bound to pay the debts of her husband out of the income. It is settled law, that a widow or other limited heir has absolute power of disposal over the income of the property inherited by her. She is not bound to make any savings and may spend the whole income just as she likes.But it is argued for the respondent, that this rule is subject to the qualification, namely, the legal necessity, which alone justifies an alienation, disappears when . . . the limited owner is shown to be in possession of a sufficient surplus, after meeting the necessary expenses. This proposition involves, that where there are binding debts to pay, the so-called absolute power over the income becomes illusory. The contention is not only illogical but is opposed to authority. The following passage from the judgment of Muthuswami Aiyar, J., in Ramaswami V/s. Mangaikarasu (1894) I.L.R. 18 M. 113 states the law very tersely: It is next contended that she was bound to apply the income of her husband's estate first in discharge of his debts instead of executing the mortgage. The net income is, under Hindu Law, as administered in this Presidency, her own exclusive property as widow, and she is not bound either to save or apply it for the benefit of the reversioners. She is no doubt bound to pay her "husband's debts from it, because she had taken charge of the whole property left by him whilst her right of inheritance extends only to the property as diminished or affected by his debts. As between her and the reversioners she is entitled to say, I will pay my huband's debts by the sale of his property and take the residue, and I desire to keep the net income derived from it and to spend or invest it as I please .

(3.) The point is more fully dealt with in Boddu Jaggayya V/s. Goli Appala Raju (1913) M.W.N. 275. That case points out, that it is not over the gross but net income, that a widow has absolute power of disposal. She takes the estate subject to payment of debts. The interest on those debts is an expense properly debitable to the income. A limited owner is thus bound to pay off the interest on the debt where there is a sufficient surplus, but it is equally clear, that it is not incumbent on her to apply any part of the income to the payment of the corpus. So stated, the rule is consistent and logical and we must, therefore, reject the view of the Lower Court, which is opposed both to reason and authority. The last mentioned case was followed in Appeal No. 214 of 1929 to which one of us was a party.