UMMATHU Vs. PATHUMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff had 3 years from the death of her husband to institute this suit for dower. As lie died on 30 December 191.4, the last day for presenting the plaint was 30 December 1917.

(2.) She actually presented it on January 3 1918 in the Small Causes Court of Cochin, that being the clay when that Court reopened after the Christmas holidays. The plaint was returned for want of jurisdiction on February 6th, as suits by a Mahom-medan for dower are excepted from the cognizance of a Court of small causes by Section 15(1) and Art. 36 of the second schedule of the Provincial Small Causes Court's Act. The Plaintiff represented the plaint on the following day in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Cochin.

(3.) The question is whether the suit was in time. It would have been in time if it had been instituted on January 3 as the Sub Court of Cochin was closed on December 30 when the period of limitation prescribed by the first schedule of the Limitation Act for such suits expired and it re-opened on January 3rd. The explanation to Section 3 shows that a suit can be said to be instituted when the plaint is presented to the proper officer. This also is the view taken in Haridas Roy V/s. Sarat Chandra Deo (1914) 18 I.C. 121, by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The proper officer in this case was the Subordinate Judge of Cochin sitting on the Original Side or the chief ministerial officer of his Court authorised under Rule 14 of the Civil Rules of Practice to receive plaints. The plaint was not so presented till February 7 when more than 3 years had elapsed from the cause of action arising. The plaintiff wishes to have the benefit of Section 4 of the Act and she would be entitled to it if she had presented her plaint on January 3 to the proper officer, seeing that both courts were closed till January 2nd. But a presentation to the wrong officer is not an institution of a suit at all. It has been clearly established by the decisions of Mira Mohidin Rowther V/s. Nallaperumal Pillai (1911) I.L.R. 36 Mad 131, Seshaglri Row V/s. Vajravelayudam Pillai (1912) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 482 and Ramalingam Ayyar V/s. Subbaier (1918) 8 L.W. 256 that for the purposes of Section 4 account cannot be taken of the closing and reopening of any other court than that in which the suit was rightly instituted.