(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration that his vendor the 1 defendant was (he nearest reversioner of the late Venkataraju and that the alienations of the immovable properties mentioned in the plaint by Venkayya, the wife of Venkataraju to the family of defendants 2 to 5 and that of defendants 6 to 11 are invalid and not binding on the plaintiff or the 1 defendant, for possession and mesne profits which were assessed at Rs. 200 for the year 1913 and for subsequent mesne profits. Various pleas were raised by the defendants, the chief of which were that the 1 defendant was not the nearest reversioner of the late Venkataraju, that the sale-deed of the 8th;of February 1913 in favour of the plaintiff- was not bona fide and valid, that the alienations by the widow were for necessity and binding on the reversioners and that the suit was barred by limitation and res-judicata. The District Munsif passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff but on appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree in so far as it related to item 1 in the plaint schedule and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. He held that Venkayya, the wife of Venkataraju executed the sale-deed dated the 14 of May 1880 on which the defendants relied and a copy of which was filed as Ex. IX. He also held that the sale-deed was executed by her to discharge a debt due by her husband, that it bound her husband's reversioners, that the 1 defendant ratified the sale of the suit land by the wife of Venkataraju and that the suit was barred by limitation as the alienees from Venkayya have been enjoying the property from 1880 without interruption. The facts found are that during the life-time of her husband, Venkataraju, his wife Venkayya, executed a sale-deed of the lands to Narasimharaju. Ex. IX which is a copy of the deed dated the 14 of May 1880 recites that Venkataraju borrowed Rs. 54-11-0 on the 30 of November 1877 and mortgaged the land described in the document to him, that the amount due on the date of the sale-deed was Rs. 79-12-0, that Venkayya borrowed Rs. 10-4-0 to discharge other debts and that the land specified in the document was sold for Rs. 90-0-0. The deed winds up as follows: As my husband Venkataraju is not of a sound mind I have to execute the said sale- deed. This is the jeroyati sale-deed executed by me," It is clear that so far as the sale is concerned Venkayya who was neither the Committee in Lunacy or the natural guardian of her husband Venkataraju, who was alleged to be a lunatic, had no power to execute the sale-deed Venkataraju died in 1882 and as the finding is that the alienees were put in possession on the date of the sale in 1880 they have been in possession under an invalid alienation by the wife of Venkataraju from 1880. Venkayya died in 1910 and the 1 defendant who is found to be the reversioner sold the property to the plaintiff in 1918. As the case is not one of an alienation by a widow, the suit does not fall under Art. 125 of the Limitation Act.
(2.) It is contended by Mr. Narayanamurthi for the appellant that as Venkataraju was insane at the date of the sale by his wife and died insane, there could be no adverse possession against Venkataraju and that at his death adverse possession could only commence against his widow in which the case the reversioner would not be barred. The question is whether adverse possession can commence to run against a person who is insane. In Smyth V/s. Byrne 1 Irish Reports 53 Irish Reports 53 it was held that a person entering on the lands of a lunatic with notice of lunacy and of the rights of the lunatic becomes a bailiff in respect of the lunatic's estate in the lands, and that where the lands are held by the lunatic under a contract of tenancy and a new letting is subsequently made to the person so entering, such new letting will be deemed a graft on the old tenancy. O Brien, L. C. observed that the same principle should be applied to lunatics as is applied to minors and that it was a well-known rule that if under certain circumstances, a person enters upon a minor's property, he becomes clothed with such a fiduciary relationship towards the minor that he cannot acquire the minor's estate for his own benefit. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff was certified to be of unsound mind and that shortly afterwards his sister came to-live on his farm and took over the working and management and before the expiration of the lease, a fresh lease was entered into in favour of his sister. On these facts the judges were of opinion that the sister was only a bailiff, the new letting being deemed only a graft on the old tenancy. In Biss In re, Biss V/s. Biss (1903) 2 Ch. 40 the question arose as to whether the renewal of a lease was to be treated for the benefit of the old lessors. Romer, L. J. in the course of his judgment observed : "I now proceed to consider the pases with reference to the position of the person obtaining the renewal. The cases where the person has clearly occupied a fiduciary position in the matter including an executor, administrator, trustee or agent need not be dwelt upon, as they present no difficulty, I need only remark in passing that it must not be forgotten that if a stranger enters into possession of an infant's property he is to be regarded as acting as a bailiff or agent for the infant in respect of that property." The learned Judge then proceeded to consider cases where the person renewing the lease did not clearly occupy a fiduciary position.
(3.) It is argued by Mr. Narayanamoorthy on the strength of the observations of Romer, L. J. that, in the case of infants, strangers entering into possession should be deemed to be bailiffs or agents for the infants and on the strength of the observations of O Brien, L. C. in Smyth v. Byrne 1. Irish Reports, 53 that the position of infants and that of lunatics is the same and that there could be no adverse possession by the purchaser from Venkayya as Venkataraju, the husband of Venkayya was a lunatic at the date of the purchase.