KATTA RAMASWAMI GUPTA Vs. KAMALAMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the plaintiff lent certain jewels to one Meenakshi Ammal for the purpose, as the plaintiff says, of decking the latter's daughter for a prospective bridegroom. Meenakshi Ammal took the jewels and pledged them with Thangavelu Mudali and Chinnaswami Sah. The defendant after redeeming the jewels from the pledgees bought them from Meenakshi Ammal. The plaintiff brought the suit against the defendant for the recovery of the value of the jewels which was decreed to her. The defendant now appeals against this judgment.

(2.) Two points are raised on defendant's behalf, first, one of fact, that the sale to the defendant was by the consent of the plaintiff. We have examined the evidence with great care. It appears that the plaintiff, who is described as somewhat simple-minded, handed the jewels to Meenakshi Ammal without the knowledge of her husband but with the knowledge of one of her sons a High Court Vakil. Meenakshi Ammal who was subsequently convicted in connection with these jewels contended that the jewels were given to her to sell or pledge in order to raise money for some theatrical business in which the plaintiff was interested. This story, was, we think, quite rightly discredited as improbable by the judge, and on the evidence it is to our minds perfectly clear that the plaintiff did in fact lend the jewels to Meenakshi Arnmal for the purpose of decking her daughter and for no other. This gratuitous bailment, for such it is in law, took place in 1917. The pledge by Meenakshi Ammal and the subsequent purchase by the defendant took place some 6 or 7 months afterwards, i. e., in June 19l8. On the facts we are of opinion that the sale to the defendant was not with the plaintiff's consent.

(3.) The more serious defence is that the defendant was a purchaser for value without notice of any defect in the title of Meenakshi Ammal to these jewels and that he is therefore protected either as falling within the Trusts Act or secondly by the provisions of Secs.108 and 178 of the Contract Act. To take the first of these, it was, strenuously argued by Mr. G. Krishna-swami Aiyar on the defendant's behalf that as Meenakshi Ammal was bailee she was therefore a trustee; if not an express trustee at least as falling within chapter IX of the Trusts Act and that the defendant as purchaser from her was therefore protected by Section 96 of the Trusts Act. Now, although a bailee may be in some respects in a fiduciary position as regards his bailor it is a very different thing from saying that a bailee is a trustee pure and simple. To begin with, the definition of a "trust" in Section 3 of the Indian Act is that it is an obligation annexed to the ownership of property whereas a "bailment" is a contract where the ownership in the chattel bailed does not pass to the bailee, and the fact that fiduciary relationship may exist between the bailee and the bailor does not necessarily make the bailee a trustee within the meaning of the Trusts Act. Now although a bailee may have sufficient interest in the property bailed to be able to maintain an action against a third person in respect of the property, still once the bailment is terminated owing to the tortious act of the bailee, there can be no doubt that the bailor is at once reinvested with the full ownership of the property bailed, and there is thus no bailment if the thing delivered is not to be specifically returned or accounted for, i. e. no bailment where the whole property is transferred. Now, with regard to chapter IX of the Trusts Act, it is headed "Of certain obligations in the nature of trusts. Of those obligations Secs.81 to 86 are examples of what is known in the English law as "resulting trusts;" those from S.87 to Section 94 are cases of "constructive trusts." There is no illustration appended to the sections, nor has any authority been quoted to us to cause us to include bailment among the obligations set out in this chapter. The contention seems to have been derived from the fact that in re re Hallett's Estate (1880) L.R. 13 Ch. D. 696 Thesiger L.J. at p 722 says that "the principles , relating to the following of trust property are equally applicable to the case of a trustee, and to the case of factors, bailees, or other kinds of agents. . . . whereas a specific chattel is intrusted by one man to another, ... then,. either the chattel itself, or the proceeds of the chattel, whether the chattel has been rightfully or wrongfully disposed of, may be followed at any time." This extract from the judgment of the learned Lord Justice does not, in our opinion, warrant the larger assumption that bailments are to be included in Chapter IX of the Trusts Act so as to afford the defendant in this case protection under Section 96. Further in Halsbury, Vol. 1, p. 563 para 1142 it is said, "Further, where the bailee, by a wrongful dealing with the chattel, has determined the bailment, all third persons, however, innocent, who purport in any way to deal with the property in the chattel, are guilty of conversion and liable to the bailor." This disposes of the first contention under this head,