NILKANTH DEVRAO NADKARNY Vs. RAMAKRISHNA VITHAL BHAT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiffs sued for an injunction against defendants Nos. 1-4 restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs in the management of the affairs of the temple of Shri Shanta Durga of Ankola, and Tor a declaration that defendants Nos. 1-4 were not the properly appointed trustees of the said temple. The first issue was whether the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit or whether it should lie in the District Court. The learned Judge said : " It is argued by Mr. Joshi that the suit is barred by Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and also by Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863." It is not now suggested that the latter section applies. The learned Judge proceeds : " The relief claimed in this suit is that the appointment of defendants Nos. 1-4 as plaintiff's co-trustees is invalid. Such a suit does not fall under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section applies where breach of trust is alleged or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of a charitable or religious trust of a public nature." He, therefore, proceeded to hear the suit and decided that the appointment of defendants Nos. 1-4 was not valid, and that they were not entitled, therefore, to take part in managing the affairs of the temple in question.

(2.) In first appeal the same question was argued, whether the suit was barred by Section 92 as the plaintiffs had not sought or obtained permission to bring the suit. The learned Judge disagreed with the opinion of the Judge in the Court below thinking that the allegations made in the plaint were allegations of a breach of trust, and that there was no question that the suit was a suit for the removal of trustees. The learned Judge said : " It is no doubt true that in form the suit is not a suit for the removal of a trustee. It is a suit for a declaration that defendants Nos. 1-4 have not been duly appointed as trustees. But this is a distinction without a difference. Section 92 is a section which ought (I think) to be liberally construed in favour of the subject. 1 It seems to me that in bringing this suit by way of analogy within the provisions of Section 92 he was construing the section liberally against the subject. However that may be, I am distinctly of opinion that the suit as framed does not lie within the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section restrict the powers of an individual to bring a suit of a particular nature without observing certain formalities, and, therefore, when a point is taken that a particular suit is of a nature coming within the provisions of section, before the Court can bar the suit for want of necessary sanction, the Court must be satisfied that the suit comes within the actual four corners of the section. That section provides very distinctly that only in two cases does the section apply : either there must be an alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature; or the direction of the Court must be deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust. In either of these two cases when a suit is brought then sanction must be obtained, and the section goes on to specify what reliefs may be obtained from the Court in suits filed under the section.

(3.) Now it seems to me that it is not necessary to direct one's attention wholly to the reliefs which the section says may be granted in particular suits governed by the section in order to decide whether or not the suit comes within the section. We have to look, in the first instance, to the principal portion of the section which lays down in what cases sanction is necessary. I agree with the opinion expressed by the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiffs here do not sue on account of any breach of trust as is contemplated by the provisions of that section, nor do they apply for any direction of the Court for the administration of the trust. Once that is conceded then it appears that the Court had jurisdiction and no sanction was required. But, as far as I can see, we are asked to extend the provisions of the section to suits which do not come within the strict words of the section, but are suits of a cognate nature, because the relief asked in this suit may by the twisting of language be considered to be a relief something in the nature of one of the reliefs mentioned in Section 92 which the Court can grant in suits brought under that section.