SUBRAMANIA GURUKKAL Vs. AMMAKKANNU AMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Plaintiff is the appellant. He brought a suit for a declaration that the alienation made on the 11 June 1883 of the pLalnt properties by the plaintiff's father and grand-father in favour of the 1 defendant (the alienation having been by sale of the kudivaram interest in certain lands) was invalid in law. The lands were service inam granted by the Karvetnagaram Zamindar as emoluments for doing puja in a temple.

(2.) One of the questions raised in the case was whether the kudivaram and the melvaram both constituted the maniyam or only the melvaram. In Muthu Goundan V/s. Perumal Aiyan the Full Bench decided in January of this year that there is a presumption in the case of grants of even inam lands (whether granted by the former ruling power or by a Zamjndar) that the grarjt was of both varams, I think that that opinion is binding upon us and I would therefore differing from the Lower Courts hold on this point that the grant was of both varams.

(3.) Another question was raised that the plaintiff was not the legal holder of the office of pujari on the date of suit as his father was alive (and is even now alive). The Lower Appellate Court held that on the true construction of the plaintiff's father's letter to the guardian of the Zemindar (that letter being Ex. Q.) and of the order of that guardian (Ex. A.) the father had not ceased to be the holder of the office, that the plaintiff was appointed by Ex. Q. merely to do the duties of the office as his father's proxy and that therefore the plaintiff's suit was unsustainable. Having however heard the two documents read and commented upon and seeing also that the plaintiff's father as plaintiff's 2nd witness deposed that he resigned the Devas-tanam service owing to illness, I think that on the true construction of these two documents the conclusion should be that the plaintiff's father did resign the office, that his resignation was accepted by the Zemindar's guardian and that the plaintiff was recognised as the holder of the office after sifch acceptance of the father's resignation. (I do not however agree with the appellant's learned vakil that it was the appointment by the guardian of the Zaroindar that entitled the plaintiff to claim the office and not his hereditary right to succeed thereto on his father's ceasing to hold it). The next question is whether the suit is barred by limitation. Both the Lower Courts held that it was barred. The alienation, as I said before, was in 1883 made by the plaintiff's father and the plaintiff's grandfather together. As the plaintiff's grandfather was the person then solely entitled to the office , and the plaintiff's fafher had no right either to the office or to the appurtenant lands at that time, his joining in the alienation was of no legal effect and the sale must be taken as one rna&e by the plaintiff's grandfather alone for all legal purposes.