MA SHWE MYA Vs. MAUNG MO HNAUNG

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant in this case was the defendant in a suit that was instituted by the respondent on February 22, 1913, seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell certain oil wells in Burma, as she is what is known as a twinzayo-i.e., one of the twenty-four people to whom the Government is in the habit of annually making grants of oil wells in British Burma. On December 18, 1903, as the settlement of a dispute that was then outstanding between herself and the respondent, the appellant entered into an agreement, through her husband as her attorney, with the respondent, for the sale to him of two sets of oil wells. The first were six out of the twelve sites that she Would obtain for 1902, and the second were three out of the twelve sites that she would obtain for 1903. It appears that so far as the twelve sites for 1902 were concerned the contract was duly satisfied, but with regard to the 1903 sites difficulties arose. On September 21, 1904, four of those sites were allotted by the Government, and on January 12, 1905, a further six were allotted, making ten in all. Eight of these were resumed by the Government on July 1, 1907, on the ground that there had been no working, and one was resumed on March 20, 1908, All the nine sites so resumed were regranted before February 3, 1912, and, at a later date, probably about March of 1912, a further twenty-three sites were granted to the appellant, who thus became possessed of all the sites which she would have received had they been annually allotted to her according to the usual practice in groups of twelve at a time. None of these sites were conveyed to the respondent, and accordingly he instituted in 1913 against the appellant the proceedings which have given rise to this appeal. The pleadings which were then filed are very instructive upon the nature of his claim. He sets out the contract of December 18, 1903; he refers to the fact that the sites allotted in 1902 had been duly transferred and alleges that ten out of the twelve sites had been received in 1903, and he concludes in this way: "Out of these"-that is out of the ten for 1903-"the plaintiff" asked the defendant to deliver three sites which still remained due to the plaintiff, but she refused to do so." He then refers to the allotments in 1912 and states that in 1912 he again "asked her to deliver three sites and she promised, to give three sites out of those which she obtained in 1912. But afterwards she did not give them." He then states that the suit is not barred by limitation and prays "for a decree with costs, for recovery of three sites out of twenty-three granted in 1912," and he sets out the numbers of the sites. It is important to observe that no one of those numbers relates to any of the sites that were originally allotted in respect of 1903, and that the whole action is deliberately founded on the alleged agreement of 1912.

(2.) On the matter coming for trial before the District Judge, he found that the verbal agreement, upon which this pleading was based, was not established by the evidence, and the Judicial Commissioner, to whom an appeal was taken from that judgment, affirmed that view, but the Judicial Commissioner, instead of affirming the decree by which the suit had been dismissed, made an order directing that there should be liberty to amend and a reference established upon that amendment enabling compensation to be assessed for the alleged breach of the contract to convey entered into in the year 1908.

(3.) The first question that arises is whether or no that leave to amend was properly given in accordance with the rules by which that leave must necessarily be regulated. All rules of Court are nothing but provisions intended to secure the proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that they should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose, sO that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised, but none the less no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action to be substituted for another, nor to change, by means of amendment, the subject matter of the suit.