(1.) The decree that was passed by the District Munsif upon this suit for redemption, though styled a preliminary decree and. passed under the Civil P. C., 1908, provided for sale of the mortgaged properties if the money required for redemption was not paid by a certain date. There was thus no need for anyone to apply for an order for sale. But in a redemption suit, the decree-holder being the mortgagor, it has been held in Govinda Taragan V/s. Veeran (1913) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 32. Govinda Menon V/s. Kombunni Mannadiar C.M.S.A and Abdul Kadir V/s. Samipandia Tevar (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 835 that he as well as the mortgagee has a right to execute the decree by applying for sale, and I think we should follow those decisions.
(2.) As regards the applications of 4 April 1916 and 23rd. June 1916 for an extension of time for depositing the redemption money in Court, it may be conceded that. they did not aid the particular form of execution which has ultimately been reached, but if they were bona fide they may well be said to have been in aid of that portion of the decree which related to redemption, and I think the decree must be treated as a whole and not split up into sections. This is the view taken in a recent decision, Venkata Reddayya V/s. Yarakayya (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 35 to which I was a party. If they were in any sense aids to execution they should be treated as steps in aid of execution.
(3.) In Abdul Kader Rowther V/s. Krishnan Malavai Nair (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 695 Sadasiva Ayyar, J., observed that an application by the decree-holder to give time to the judgment- debtor merely as a matter of grace would be a step in retardation. In the present case the applicant though he was the decree-holder was the person who had to pay and he was applying for time not as a matter of grace to a judgment-debtor, but in order the better to enable himself to execute the decree, the execution of which would have been completed as soon as the redemption money was paid.