NARAYANASAMY NAICKER Vs. PERIASAMY ODAYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the course of hill and able arguments on either side to which we have listened; no reported case has been cited in whicli a question arose of a choice between the application of Art. 134 or 141 of the Limitation Act. Kannusami Thanjirayan V/s. Muthusgmi Pillai (1916) 5 Law Weekly 250 was im instance of a conflict between Art. 134 and Art. 144. I then observed that it was clear that the plaintiff could not have resort to Art. 144 unless he first showed that Art. 1.34 was inapplicable, the reason being that Art. 144 is the residuary article for suits for the possession of immoveable property, as is indicated by the words " not hereby otherwise specially provided for."

(2.) There is no indication that Art. 134 should not be applied to suits for possession of immoveable property, which but for that article might have been governed by the period of limitation prescribed in Art. 141. In Secti Kutll V/s. Kiinhi Paihumma (1917) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 1040 the Learned Chief Justice after discussing the law of limitation applicable to similar actions under the English Act pointed out that Art. 134 of the Indian Limitation Act was in its origin wholly self-contained and was not appended as a proviso to any of the sections. A reversioner's disability to sue for possession while a Hindu female is the owner in possession of the estate has not been treated by the legislature on the same footing as the disability of a minor, an idiot, or an insane person, in whose favour by Section 6 of the Act an extra period has been allowed for instituting their suits whatever may be the article applicable to a suit of the same description by a person not so disabled.

(3.) The transfer by the mortgagee Vasudeva Naick of the absolute title to the defendant was in 1900. A perusal of Exhibit III leaves no doubt in my mind that it was an absolute sale for good consideration. Kaveri Ammal the last female owner died in 1906. She had 6 years before her death to sue under Art. 134 to recover the property, and the plaintiff had 6 years after her death till 1912, but he neglected to move in the matter till 1914.