DHIRO KOCH Vs. GOBINDA DEV MISHRA BURA SATRIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit for damages for defamatory statements made against the plaintiff by the defendants in, their written statement in a suit. The plaintiff is the high priest of the Barpeta Satra. Some Pujaris of the Satra were the plaintiffs in the suit in which the statements were made the plaintiff was no party to that suit. In the written statement in that salt the defendants slated that the present plaintiff misappropriated the funds and misused the seal of the Satra, and also alleged that for a certain reason (which they did not specify) the Brahmans of Barpeta would not eat with him. The defence in the present suit was that the statements were privileged, that they were true and were necessary for the purposes of the previous suit. The Courts below did not attach any importance to the statements about misappropriation and misuse of seal, but they were of opinion that the last statement, viz., that for a special reason the Brahmans of Barpeta will not eat with the plaintiff, the obvious meaning of which was that the plaintiff had been excommunicated for some scandal affecting him or members of his family, was defamatory. The Courts below held that the statements were not absolutely privileged, but would be protected if they were relevant to the suit and made in good faith, that the statements were not relevant to the suit and had no bearing upon the points at issue, that there was no good reason for mentioning the plaintiff at all in the written statement and the allegation was dearly the result of spite, and that the statement was untrue and malicious. Damages, were accordingly awarded to the plaintiff. The defendants have appealed to this Court, and the only question for consideration is whether a defamatory statement in pleadings is absolutely privileged.

(2.) There is no doubt that in England the statements would be absolutely privileged, As observed by Lopes, J., in Royal Aquarium V/s. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 : 61 L.J.Q.B. 409 : 66 L.T. 513 : 40 W.R. 450 : 56 J.P. 404, "the authorities establish beyond question that neither party, witness, Counsel, Jury, nor Judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in office; that no action of libel or slander lies, whether against Judges Counsel, witnesses or parties, for words written or spoken in the course of any proceeding before any Court recognised by law, and this though the words written or spoken were written or spoken maliciously without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill-will and anger against the person defamed." The question is how far the principle applies in this country, so far as civil liability for damages for defamatory statements made by parties in pleadings is concerned. There is considerable divergence of judicial opinion upon the question how far defamatory statements made by parties, or witnesses are privileged in this country. It is unnecessary to consider the question so far as it concerns defamatory statements made by witnesses, the only question for our consideration being whether defamatory statements made by parties in pleadings are absolutely privileged. So far as criminal liability for defamation is concerned, the law in this country is governed by the provisions of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, and defamatory statements are punishable unless they fall within one of the exceptions to that section. In making it criminal to defame another, the Legislature has made it illegal so as to make it a cause of action if the person defamed was, injured.

(3.) So far as defamatory statements in pleadings are concerned, the actual decisions in our Court (with the exception of only one case) are in favour of the view that they are not absolutely, privileged, though there are obiter dicta in some cases to the contrary.