MAHADEO PRASAD SINGH Vs. MATA PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of possession of some immovable property and mesne profits. It appears that Pirthi Pal Singh was the last male owner and he died leaving a widow, Musammat Gajraj Kunwar, and a daughter, Musammat Balraj Kunwar. After the death of the widow, Musammat Balraj Kunwar entered into possession of the property as a limited owner, In the year 1897 Suraj Pal Singh was the immediate reversioner. On the 15 of October, 1897, Musammat Balraj Kunwar executed a perpetual lease in favour of Mata Prasad and Debi Sahai, the present defendants, on payment of a nazrana of Rs. 2,000, which was paid in cash before the Sub-Registrar. The rent reserved was Rs. 1,255-5-2, which was exactly equal to the Government revenue to be paid by the lessor. This lease was attested by Suraj Pal Singh the immediate reversioner. On the 29 of October, 1901, Musammat Balraj Kunwar and Thakur Suraj Pal Singh jointly executed a deed of gift of the leased properties in favour of the same lessees. Mutation of names followed on the basis of this deed of gift and Suraj Pal Singh was examined on oath and stated that he had consented to this gift. Musammat Balraj Kunwar died on the 9 of September, 1906. On her death Suraj Pal Singh became entitled to the estate and got possession of it. While being examined in the mutation court he again referred to the deed of gift and did not say that he repudiated it. Suraj Pal Singh lived for some three years more and died some time in 1909. It was not till the 4 of September, 1918, that the present suit was instituted on behalf of the minor son of Suraj Pal Singh under the guardianship of his mother. The suit is for possession of the gifted properties as against the donees by avoidance of the deed of gift, dated the 29 of October, 1901. The plaintiff's case as set forth in the plaint was that Suraj Pal had been made to execute the deed of gift under undue influence and pressure that in any case his consent as a mere reversioner was of no avail and the transfer being without legal necessity, was not binding on the present plaintiff. On behalf of the defendants the allegations of undue influence and pressure were denied and it was pleaded that the consent of Suraj Pal Singh, the then immediate reversioner, completely estopped him as well as the present plaintiff from challenging the validity of the transfer. It was also pleaded that the gift had been made in lieu of good services rendered by the defendants ancestor and was therefore not without consideration. There were a number of other pleas also raised which it is not necessary to mention. The court of first instance dismissed the suit, holding that the gifts was for some consideration; that it was made with the consent of Suraj Pal Singh; that no undue influence had been proved, and that it was binding on the present plaintiff. The plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court; but on his behalf no plea is raised in the grounds of appeal as to there having been any undue influence or pressure. It has, however, been strongly urged that the transfer was without consideration, that the consent of Suraj Pal Singh at a time when he had no transferable interest in the property, was invalid and that there is no estoppel against the plaintiff. It will be noted that the present suit is not for the cancellation of the lease of the 15 of October, 1897. The plaintiff ignores this lease altogether, and the defendants do not plead that, even if the gift is set aside, the plaintiff is not entitled to possession as the defendants hold the property under that perpetual lease. In fact both parties have treated this lease as having been superseded and put an end to by the deed of gift. This latter deed says in so many terms that "it should be known that the perpetual lease, dated the 15 October, 1897, and registered on the 3 of December of the said year, which exists at present, is no longer to be considered valid and no right would be enjoyed under it," The perpetual lease had been granted in lieu of Rs. 2,000 paid as nazrana and was also in consideration of good services rendered by the lessees and their predecessors. It provided that if the lessees were dispossessed of any part of the leased property they would have power to realize a proportionate amount of the nazrana. If, therefore, the lessees gave up all their rights under the lease and took a fresh document in the form of a deed of gift it cannot be said that this latter deed was absolutely without any consideration.

(2.) The learned Counsel for the appellant, however, contends that the consent of Suraj Pal Singh can, at best, raise a presumption that there was legal necessity for the transfer, but as in this case it is conclusively shown that even if the transaction was not a pure gift it was certainly not for any legal necessity, the consent of the immediate reversioner had no operative effect. He has strongly relied on the following cases: Amrit Narayan Singh V/s. Gaya Singh (1917) I.L.R. 45 Calc. 590; Gur Narain V/s. Sheolal Singh (1918) I.L.R. 46 Calc. 566; Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden (1918) I.L.R. 42 Had. 523 and Bai Parvati V/s. Dayabhai Manchharam (1919) I.L.R. 44 Bom. 488.

(3.) In the case of Amrit Narayan Singh V/s. Gaya Singh (1917) I.L.R. 45 Calc. 590 all that was held was that the guardian of a minor reversioner cannot bargain with the reversionary right on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto, for until the property actually vests in him he has nothing to assign or relinquish, No one can dispute that the right of succession of a reversioner is not a transferable right. That case, however, has no bearing on the present case, because no question of estoppel arose in that case nor could it have arisen against the minor reversioner.