LAWS(PVC)-1921-11-100

NABAKISHORE MANDAL Vs. UPENDRAKISHORE MANDAL

Decided On November 18, 1921
NABAKISHORE MANDAL Appellant
V/S
UPENDRAKISHORE MANDAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A person who deals with a Hindu widow having a limited estate must be aware that he may be called upon to establish the facts which justify the transactions under which he claims. The appellants in this case, who are the successors-in-title of one Rajkishore Mandal, find themselves in that position.

(2.) Rajkishore Mandal entered into two transactions, in the one case with two Hindu widows, and, in the other case, with one, These transactions are now impeached, and the burden of proving them valid lies on the appellants. The first was a lease of the 17 September, 1869, which was executed by two Hindu widows, Prasana Kumari Dasi and Bamakali Dasi. Their estate in the property arose in the following way. Prasana was the widow of Madhusudan and Bamakali was the widow of Harinarayan his brother. Harinarayan, when he died, was entitled to an undivided third share in properties held jointly, and Madhusudan, who died in 1867, was entitled to the remaining two-thirds. The case that is suggested is that this lease was required for the purpose of raising the money necessary for the payment of debts and the performance of the Shradh in connection with Madhusudan, Now Madhusudan had died on the 13 August, 1867, and certainly a period had not elapsed so long as to render it probable that the debts must have been paid; but, fortunately, the circumstances connected with his estate are not unknown, and there is information that enables their Lordships to recast what that position was. There is no doubt that before his death he had been borrowing money, sometimes in small sums and sometimes in large, but at the date of his death the debts are nowhere put as exceeding Rs. 15,000 or Rs. 16,000, which is probably a very liberal estimate. On the other hand, there is evidence, part of which was called on behalf of the appellants themselves, to show that he had moveable property to the extent of Rs. 20,000. The petition of the widow showed that he had debts owing to him to the extent of Rs. 9,000 which, it may be, were included in the Rs. 20,000 of moveable property. In addition to that, there can be no doubt that part of the property of the testator had been disposed of shortly after his death, because, although the actual deed of sale is not produced, a deed of sale from the person who purported to have bought is, and that shows that property belonging to Madhusudan had in fact been disposed of. There, therefore, was not upon the evidence as it stands, any reason whatever why the property included in the lease should have been used for the purpose of paying debts, and, indeed, if such necessities were the real justification for the transaction it is not probable that it would take the form of a permanent lease, but would have been an out- and-out sale, Their Lordships have no hesitation in saying that the proof of the necessity required to justify the lease of the 17 September, 1869, is not forthcoming.

(3.) It is then said that this lease must have been a lease for the benefit of the estate, and that it can be supported upon that ground. It is not easy, and in this case it is not necessary, to define what is exactly the character of the transaction entered into by a Hindu widow, which can be supported on the ground that it enured for the benefit of the estate. It is sufficient to say that the mere fact that the rent reserved was a fair market rent, or the price obtained was a fair market price, cannot alone and in themselves be regarded as sufficient, and in the present case there is nothing more suggested.