(1.) WE are invited in this Rule, under very exceptional circumstances, to set aside an order by which the Court below has assessed mesne profits at the instance of the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor had preferred an appeal to this Court against a previous order in the same proceedings, and on the 9th February last, he obtained a Rule calling upon the decree-holder to show cause why the proceedings for the ascertainment of mesne profits should not be stayed pending the disposal of that appeal. At the time the Rule was granted, the Court also made an ad interim order for stay of proceedings for the determination of mesne profits. Two days later, the judgment-debtor applied to the Munsif for adjournment of the proceedings pending before him. In support of the application, an affidavit was filed in which it was specifically stated that the High Court had already stayed proceedings for the determination of mesne profits. To the affidavit was annexed as an exhibit, a letter in original written by the Vakil of this Court who had obtained the Rule to the Plaader in charge of the case in the Court of the Munsif. It was explicitly stated in this letter that the High Court had issued a Rule and had also ordered an ad interim stay of the proceedings pending the hearing of the Rule. Thereupon the Munsif recorded the following order: "Judgment-debtor again applies to stay the ascertainment of mesne profits with a plea that an appeal has been preferred and an affidavit in support of the petition filed. The petition being groundless is rejected." The Munsif then proceeded to examine witnesses and ultimately on the same day made an order for assessment of mesne profits. It is beyond controversy that the Munsif has laid himself open to the gravest censure for the manner in which he has conducted himself, and the explanation he has submitted is wholly unsatisfactory. His act plainly amounts to a contempt of the authority of this Court, and we trust he will profit by the warning now given that the arm of this Court is long enough to reach any person who may behave in this manner. As regards the order he has made, we need only observe that it is wholly without jurisdiction and must be cancelled: Hukum Chand v. Kamalanand 33 C. 927 at p. 944 : 3 C.L.J. 67.
(2.) THE result is, that this Rule is made absolute, and the order made on the 11th February 1911 discharged as made entirely without jurisdiction.