LAWS(PVC)-1911-11-162

CUDDAPARAZU ANANTARAZU Vs. CUDDAPARAZU NARAYANARAZU

Decided On November 07, 1911
CUDDAPARAZU ANANTARAZU Appellant
V/S
CUDDAPARAZU NARAYANARAZU Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We think that the decree of the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. The learned Advocate--General for the appellant, though admitting that the attachment of the 29th November 1898, was an invasion of the plaintiffs right and gave a cause of action for a declaratory suit has, we think rightly, contended that the sale on the 30th June 1906 was a fresh invasion of the plaintiffs right and gave a fresh cause of action The District Judge has referred to a second attachment but apparently the first attachment was not discharged, and the Advocate-General does not base his argument on any allegation that the sale was not in pursuance of the original attachment of the 29th November 1898. Nor is it contended that the attachment is a continuing wrong ; but we think that the sale ought properly to be regarded as a fresh and greater invasion of the plaintiffs right, so as to give a fresh cause of action. The sale, though held in pursuance of the attachment, was not a necessary consequence of it. The plaintiffs, no doubt, might then have sued, but we do not think they were bound to sue--see Robert Skinner v. Shankar Lal (1908) I.I.R. 31 A. 10 (Note) The attachment gave the judgment-creditor certain rights in execution, but the title to the property continues in the owner, notwithstanding the attachment, and it so continues even if the owner s objection to the attachment be disallowed--Narasimha Row v. Ganga Ram (1908) 18 M.L.J. 590 But when a sale takes place and is confirmed the title passes to the purchaser from the date of the sale (Section 65, Civil Procedure Code). The owner s title is affected by a sale in an altogether different and greater degree than it is by an attachment. We think this gives the owner of the property a fresh cause of action. In the present case the suit was brought within six years from the date of sale, and was, therefore, not barred by Article 120 Schedule II, of the Limitation Act of 1877.

(2.) We must, therefore, set aside the decree of the District Judge and direct him to restore the appeal to his file and dispose of it according to law.

(3.) The costs in this appeal will abide and follow the result.