KOMMA SOMAKKA Vs. KODIDALA PEDDA RAMIAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case we are asked to revise, by way of appeal or under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, an order made by the District Judge of Cuddapah upon a petition presented to him under Sections 24 and 43, Guardians and Wards Act, by the guardian of a certain Hindu female minor praying for permission to give the minor in marriage to a certain person mentioned in the petition, and for an order directing the appellant in this appeal, who is the surviving widow of the father of the minor girl and in possession of his estate, to pay Rs. 800 for the expenses of the contemplated marriage. The appellant appeared in answer to the notice and pleaded, that under the circumstances mentioned in her counter-petition, she was not liable to make any payment, and that the proposed marriage was not suitable. She took no objection to the jurisdiction of the District Court to make any order against her on the petition, and after hearing the Pleaders on both sides the Court passed this order: "The petition is allowed with costs. Rupees 300 is sanctioned; Fees Rs. 5." The order, having regard to the prayer in the petition, has the effect of directing the counter-petitioner to pay Rs. 300 and costs to the guardian. No issues were framed and no evidence appears to have been taken and apparently none was adduced by either party.

(2.) The first question argued is, that the order is bad for want of jurisdiction and must be set aside on that ground. Now, there can be no doubt that so much of the order as directs the appellant to pay Rs. 300 to the petitioner for purposes of the minor s marriage is not warranted by any provision of the Guardians and Wards Act. This is conceded by Mr. Seshagiri Iyer, who appeared for the respondent. But he contends that as the District Court could have in a suit properly framed for the purpose passed a decree to the came effect, this order cannot be said to have been passed without jurisdiction but at the worst there was only an irregularity in the way the Court assumed jurisdiction, and, as no objection was taken to the course adopted at the time, it must be deemed to have been waived and the order cannot now be impeached for want of jurisdiction or on the ground of irregular exercise of jurisdiction. He does not, however, contend, and very rightly, that, if the order is without jurisdiction altogether, either waiver of objection or consent on the part of the appellant to the course followed could make the order valid. There can be no doubt that the District Court which passed the order appealed against could have in a regularly instituted suit passed a decree against the appellant to substantially the same purport. At the same time, the power vested in the District Court under the Guardians and Wards Act is so totally dissimilar to its power as a Court of ordinary Civil Jurisdiction that I. think it will be going much too far to say that an order purporting to be made under, but which in fact is not warranted by, the provisions of that Act can be treated as a decree passed in a suit. The two jurisdictions are wholly distinct, though exercisable by the same official. It is not a case of exercise of the same jurisdiction by different forms of procedure.

(3.) The whole scheme of the Guardians and Wards Act, generally speaking, is to entrust to the District Court the duty of looking after the welfare of the minor s person and property, and for this purpose it gives it power to appoint a guardian to have charge of the minor s person and property as the most feasible mode of discharging its duty. The guardian is really the hand of the District Court, and is to act under its advice, control and constant supervision. The Act does not profess to give the District Court any power or authority over persons or other than the guardian or the minor except in so far as it deals with the question as to who is the proper person to be appointed guardian or whether a particular guardian should be removed or not and for the purpose of restoring the ward to the custody of the guardian. Otherwise, the enforcement of rights or claims of the ward or against the ward is left to be regulated by ordinary proceedings by suits, and the Act does not provide any machinery for deciding upon or enforcing any such claims, though so far as the guardian is concerned the District Court is vested with very wide disciplinary power over him in order that it may enforce the orders passed against him under the Act. The jurisdiction or power conferred upon the District Court by this Act is of a very special and limited character, and the procedure prescribed under the Act, which is of a summary character, though appropriate for the determination of questions arising therein, is very different from the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code for the trial of suits. That being so, can we uphold an order such as this, which purports to be made under, but is not in fact warranted by, the provisions of that Act as a decree passed in a suit? After the best consideration I have been able to give to the matter, my conclusion, as already indicated, is that the question must be answered in the negative.